US49: Hashed password on server

.gitlab-ci.yml

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ build-image:
   script:
     - docker build --pull -t "$CI_REGISTRY_IMAGE:testing" -f Dockerfile.testing .
     - docker push "$CI_REGISTRY_IMAGE:testing"
-     
+
 daemon-jsonCommaderTest:
   stage: test
   before_script:
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ daemon-jsonCommaderTest:
   - docker pull "$CI_REGISTRY_IMAGE:testing"
   - docker run -d --name cont "$CI_REGISTRY_IMAGE:testing"
   - docker exec cont daemon/build/test/jsonCommanderTest
-    
+
 cli-cmdman_test:
   stage: test
   before_script:
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ cli-cmdman_test:
   - docker pull "$CI_REGISTRY_IMAGE:testing"
   - docker run -d --name cont "$CI_REGISTRY_IMAGE:testing"
   - docker exec cont cli/build/test/cmdman_test
-  
+
 cli-logintest:
   stage: test
   before_script:
@@ -49,9 +49,10 @@ cli-logintest:
   script:
   - docker pull "$CI_REGISTRY_IMAGE:testing"
   - docker run -d --name cont "$CI_REGISTRY_IMAGE:testing"
+  - sleep 10
   - docker exec cont cli/build/test/logintest_pos.sh
   - docker exec cont cli/build/test/logintest_neg.sh
-  
+
 cli-cryptotest:
   stage: test
   before_script:
@@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ cli-cryptotest:
   script:
   - docker pull "$CI_REGISTRY_IMAGE:testing"
   - docker run -d --name cont "$CI_REGISTRY_IMAGE:testing"
+  - sleep 10
   - docker exec cont cli/build/test/cryptoput.sh /root/build/files
   - docker exec cont cli/build/test/cryptoget.sh /root/build/files
-  
+

Dockerfile

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ RUN mkdir /root/build/files \
 
 # Copy all required data into image
 COPY .cmake_modules/ /root/.cmake_modules
+COPY libs/ /root/libs
 COPY /daemon/include /root/build/include
 COPY /daemon/src /root/build/src
 COPY /daemon/test /root/build/test

Dockerfile.testing

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ RUN git clone https://github.com/google/googletest.git \
 
 # Copy all required data into image
 COPY .cmake_modules/ /root/build/.cmake_modules
+COPY libs/ /root/build/libs
 RUN mkdir -p /root/build/daemon/build /root/build/cli/build
 RUN mkdir -p /root/build/gui/build
 
@@ -61,7 +62,9 @@ RUN mkdir /root/build/files \
     && echo "interface=lo" >> /root/build/config.txt \
     && echo "userdatabase=userStorage.txt" >> /root/build/config.txt \
     && echo "filedirectory=./files/" >> /root/build/config.txt \
-    && echo "activateCovertChannel=false" >> /root/build/config.txt
+    && echo "activateCovertChannel=false" >> /root/build/config.txt \
+    && touch /root/build/userStorage.txt \
+    && rm /root/build/userStorage.txt
 
 # Compile daemon
 RUN cd daemon/build && cmake -DENABLE_TESTS=true .. && make -j$(nproc) \

daemon/src/CMakeLists.txt

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 2.8)
 
 set(CMAKE_RUNTIME_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/bin)
 
-add_executable(ccats src/main.cpp src/Server.cpp src/base64.cpp src/JsonCommander.cpp src/FileManager.cpp src/UserManager.cpp src/Config.cpp src/CovertChannel/CovertChannel.cpp src/CovertChannel/ForwardChannel.cpp src/Notifications.cpp src/Queue.cpp src/CovertChannel/ChannelControls.cpp)
+add_executable(ccats src/main.cpp src/Server.cpp src/base64.cpp src/JsonCommander.cpp src/FileManager.cpp src/UserManager.cpp src/Config.cpp src/CovertChannel/CovertChannel.cpp src/CovertChannel/ForwardChannel.cpp src/Notifications.cpp src/Queue.cpp src/CovertChannel/ChannelControls.cpp ../libs/libbcrypt/bcrypt.c ../libs/libbcrypt/crypt_blowfish/crypt_blowfish.c ../libs/libbcrypt/crypt_blowfish/crypt_gensalt.c ../libs/libbcrypt/crypt_blowfish/wrapper.c)
 
 # dependencies used by server only
 find_package(libtins 4.2 REQUIRED)

daemon/src/UserManager.cpp

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #include "../include/UserManager.h"
+#include "../../libs/libbcrypt/bcrypt.h"
 
-// TODO passwords are stored and checked in plain text
 // TODO read userStorage file location from config
 
 // initialize static filename to empty string
@@ -10,11 +10,8 @@ void UserManager::init(const std::string &file) {
 	filename = file;
 	std::ifstream ifile(filename);
 	if (!ifile.is_open()) {
-		// create new file if userStorage does not exist
-		std::ofstream ofile;
-		ofile.open(filename);
-		ofile << "user;pass\n";
-		ofile.close();
+		// create new file by adding a user if userStorage does not exist
+		addUser("user", "pass");
 		std::cout << "Created \"" << filename << "\" and added the default user" << std::endl;
 	}
 	ifile.close();
@@ -24,8 +21,15 @@ bool UserManager::isAllowed(const std::string &name, const std::string &pw) {
 	std::map<std::string, std::string> user_map;
 	readFromFile(user_map);
 	auto it = user_map.find(name);
-	// check if user exists and pw is equal
-	if (it != user_map.end() && (it->second.compare(pw) == 0)) {
+	// check if user exists and pw is valid
+	if (it != user_map.end()) {
+
+		// check bcrypt hash
+		std::string hash = it->second;
+		int ret = bcrypt_checkpw(pw.c_str(), hash.c_str());
+		if (ret != 0)
+			return false;
+
 		return true;
 	}
 	return false;
@@ -39,7 +43,21 @@ bool UserManager::addUser(const std::string &name, const std::string &pw) {
 	if (it != user_map.end()) {
 		return false;
 	}
-	user_map.insert(std::pair<std::string, std::string>(name, pw));
+
+	// calculate bcrypt hash
+	std::string salt;
+	std::string hash;
+	salt.resize(BCRYPT_HASHSIZE);
+	hash.resize(BCRYPT_HASHSIZE);
+
+	int ret = bcrypt_gensalt(10, &salt.front());
+	if (ret != 0)
+		return false;
+	ret = bcrypt_hashpw(pw.c_str(), salt.c_str(), &hash.front());
+	if (ret != 0)
+		return false;
+
+	user_map.insert(std::pair<std::string, std::string>(name, hash));
 	writeToFile(user_map);
 	return true;
 }

libs/libbcrypt/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+*.o
+*.a
+*.3
+!crypt_blowfish/crypt.3

libs/libbcrypt/COPYING

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+Creative Commons Legal Code
+
+CC0 1.0 Universal
+
+    CREATIVE COMMONS CORPORATION IS NOT A LAW FIRM AND DOES NOT PROVIDE
+    LEGAL SERVICES. DISTRIBUTION OF THIS DOCUMENT DOES NOT CREATE AN
+    ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. CREATIVE COMMONS PROVIDES THIS
+    INFORMATION ON AN "AS-IS" BASIS. CREATIVE COMMONS MAKES NO WARRANTIES
+    REGARDING THE USE OF THIS DOCUMENT OR THE INFORMATION OR WORKS
+    PROVIDED HEREUNDER, AND DISCLAIMS LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM
+    THE USE OF THIS DOCUMENT OR THE INFORMATION OR WORKS PROVIDED
+    HEREUNDER.
+
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+"License"). The License shall be deemed effective as of the date CC0 was
+applied by Affirmer to the Work. Should any part of the License for any
+reason be judged legally invalid or ineffective under applicable law, such
+partial invalidity or ineffectiveness shall not invalidate the remainder
+of the License, and in such case Affirmer hereby affirms that he or she
+will not (i) exercise any of his or her remaining Copyright and Related
+Rights in the Work or (ii) assert any associated claims and causes of
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+4. Limitations and Disclaimers.
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libs/libbcrypt/Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+CC = gcc
+CFLAGS = $(shell grep '^CFLAGS = ' crypt_blowfish/Makefile | cut -d= -f2-)
+.PHONY: crypt_blowfish
+
+all: bcrypt.a
+
+test: bcrypt.c crypt_blowfish
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -DTEST_BCRYPT -c bcrypt.c
+	$(CC) -o bcrypt_test bcrypt.o crypt_blowfish/*.o
+
+bcrypt.a: bcrypt.o crypt_blowfish
+	ar r bcrypt.a bcrypt.o crypt_blowfish/*.o
+
+bcrypt.o: bcrypt.c
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c bcrypt.c
+
+crypt_blowfish:
+	$(MAKE) -C crypt_blowfish
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *.o bcrypt_test bcrypt.a *~ core
+	$(MAKE) -C crypt_blowfish clean

libs/libbcrypt/README

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+This library is a simple wrapper providing a convenient reentrant interface for
+the bcrypt password hashing algorithm implementation as provided by Solar
+Designer at http://www.openwall.com/crypt/. An exact copy of that source code
+is included in the crypt_blowfish subdirectory.
+
+The provided C interface is inspired in the bcrypt Python module that can be
+found at http://code.google.com/p/py-bcrypt/, and consists of a function to
+generate salts with the characteristic work factor parameter, one to generate
+password hashes which can also used to verify passwords and one designed
+specifically to verify passwords and avoid timing attacks. Please check the
+header bcrypt.h. It contains the prototypes and lots of comments with examples.
+
+All this code is released to the public domain under the terms of CC0. See the
+COPYING file for the legal text.

libs/libbcrypt/bcrypt.c

@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+/*
+ * bcrypt wrapper library
+ *
+ * Written in 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015 by Ricardo Garcia <r@rg3.name>
+ *
+ * To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all copyright
+ * and related and neighboring rights to this software to the public domain
+ * worldwide. This software is distributed without any warranty.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the CC0 Public Domain Dedication along
+ * with this software. If not, see
+ * <http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/>.
+ */
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "bcrypt.h"
+#include "crypt_blowfish/ow-crypt.h"
+
+#define RANDBYTES (16)
+
+static int try_close(int fd)
+{
+	int ret;
+	for (;;) {
+		errno = 0;
+		ret = close(fd);
+		if (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+			continue;
+		break;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int try_read(int fd, char *out, size_t count)
+{
+	size_t total;
+	ssize_t partial;
+
+	total = 0;
+	while (total < count)
+	{
+		for (;;) {
+			errno = 0;
+			partial = read(fd, out + total, count - total);
+			if (partial == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+				continue;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (partial < 1)
+			return -1;
+
+		total += partial;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is a best effort implementation. Nothing prevents a compiler from
+ * optimizing this function and making it vulnerable to timing attacks, but
+ * this method is commonly used in crypto libraries like NaCl.
+ *
+ * Return value is zero if both strings are equal and nonzero otherwise.
+*/
+static int timing_safe_strcmp(const char *str1, const char *str2)
+{
+	const unsigned char *u1;
+	const unsigned char *u2;
+	int ret;
+	int i;
+
+	int len1 = strlen(str1);
+	int len2 = strlen(str2);
+
+	/* In our context both strings should always have the same length
+	 * because they will be hashed passwords. */
+	if (len1 != len2)
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Force unsigned for bitwise operations. */
+	u1 = (const unsigned char *)str1;
+	u2 = (const unsigned char *)str2;
+
+	ret = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < len1; ++i)
+		ret |= (u1[i] ^ u2[i]);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int bcrypt_gensalt(int factor, char salt[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE])
+{
+	int fd;
+	char input[RANDBYTES];
+	int workf;
+	char *aux;
+
+	fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+	if (fd == -1)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (try_read(fd, input, RANDBYTES) != 0) {
+		if (try_close(fd) != 0)
+			return 4;
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	if (try_close(fd) != 0)
+		return 3;
+
+	/* Generate salt. */
+	workf = (factor < 4 || factor > 31)?12:factor;
+	aux = crypt_gensalt_rn("$2a$", workf, input, RANDBYTES,
+			       salt, BCRYPT_HASHSIZE);
+	return (aux == NULL)?5:0;
+}
+
+int bcrypt_hashpw(const char *passwd, const char salt[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE], char hash[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE])
+{
+	char *aux;
+	aux = crypt_rn(passwd, salt, hash, BCRYPT_HASHSIZE);
+	return (aux == NULL)?1:0;
+}
+
+int bcrypt_checkpw(const char *passwd, const char hash[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE])
+{
+	int ret;
+	char outhash[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
+
+	ret = bcrypt_hashpw(passwd, hash, outhash);
+	if (ret != 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	return timing_safe_strcmp(hash, outhash);
+}
+
+#ifdef TEST_BCRYPT
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+int main(void)
+{
+	clock_t before;
+	clock_t after;
+	char salt[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
+	char hash[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
+	int ret;
+
+	const char pass[] = "hi,mom";
+	const char hash1[] = "$2a$10$VEVmGHy4F4XQMJ3eOZJAUeb.MedU0W10pTPCuf53eHdKJPiSE8sMK";
+	const char hash2[] = "$2a$10$3F0BVk5t8/aoS.3ddaB3l.fxg5qvafQ9NybxcpXLzMeAt.nVWn.NO";
+
+	ret = bcrypt_gensalt(12, salt);
+	assert(ret == 0);
+	printf("Generated salt: %s\n", salt);
+	before = clock();
+	ret = bcrypt_hashpw("testtesttest", salt, hash);
+	assert(ret == 0);
+	after = clock();
+	printf("Hashed password: %s\n", hash);
+	printf("Time taken: %f seconds\n",
+	       (double)(after - before) / CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
+
+	ret = bcrypt_hashpw(pass, hash1, hash);
+	assert(ret == 0);
+	printf("First hash check: %s\n", (strcmp(hash1, hash) == 0)?"OK":"FAIL");
+	ret = bcrypt_hashpw(pass, hash2, hash);
+	assert(ret == 0);
+	printf("Second hash check: %s\n", (strcmp(hash2, hash) == 0)?"OK":"FAIL");
+
+	before = clock();
+	ret = (bcrypt_checkpw(pass, hash1) == 0);
+	after = clock();
+	printf("First hash check with bcrypt_checkpw: %s\n", ret?"OK":"FAIL");
+	printf("Time taken: %f seconds\n",
+	       (double)(after - before) / CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
+
+	before = clock();
+	ret = (bcrypt_checkpw(pass, hash2) == 0);
+	after = clock();
+	printf("Second hash check with bcrypt_checkpw: %s\n", ret?"OK":"FAIL");
+	printf("Time taken: %f seconds\n",
+	       (double)(after - before) / CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif

libs/libbcrypt/bcrypt.h

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+#ifndef BCRYPT_H_
+#define BCRYPT_H_
+/*
+ * bcrypt wrapper library
+ *
+ * Written in 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015 by Ricardo Garcia <r@rg3.name>
+ *
+ * To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all copyright
+ * and related and neighboring rights to this software to the public domain
+ * worldwide. This software is distributed without any warranty.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the CC0 Public Domain Dedication along
+ * with this software. If not, see
+ * <http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/>.
+ */
+
+#define BCRYPT_HASHSIZE	(64)
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * This function expects a work factor between 4 and 31 and a char array to
+ * store the resulting generated salt. The char array should typically have
+ * BCRYPT_HASHSIZE bytes at least. If the provided work factor is not in the
+ * previous range, it will default to 12.
+ *
+ * The return value is zero if the salt could be correctly generated and
+ * nonzero otherwise.
+ *
+ */
+int bcrypt_gensalt(int workfactor, char salt[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE]);
+
+/*
+ * This function expects a password to be hashed, a salt to hash the password
+ * with and a char array to leave the result. Both the salt and the hash
+ * parameters should have room for BCRYPT_HASHSIZE characters at least.
+ *
+ * It can also be used to verify a hashed password. In that case, provide the
+ * expected hash in the salt parameter and verify the output hash is the same
+ * as the input hash. However, to avoid timing attacks, it's better to use
+ * bcrypt_checkpw when verifying a password.
+ *
+ * The return value is zero if the password could be hashed and nonzero
+ * otherwise.
+ */
+int bcrypt_hashpw(const char *passwd, const char salt[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE],
+		  char hash[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE]);
+
+/*
+ * This function expects a password and a hash to verify the password against.
+ * The internal implementation is tuned to avoid timing attacks.
+ *
+ * The return value will be -1 in case of errors, zero if the provided password
+ * matches the given hash and greater than zero if no errors are found and the
+ * passwords don't match.
+ *
+ */
+int bcrypt_checkpw(const char *passwd, const char hash[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE]);
+
+/*
+ * Brief Example
+ * -------------
+ *
+ * Hashing a password:
+ *
+ *	char salt[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
+ *	char hash[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
+ *	int ret;
+ *
+ *	ret = bcrypt_gensalt(12, salt);
+ *	assert(ret == 0);
+ *	ret = bcrypt_hashpw("thepassword", salt, hash);
+ *	assert(ret == 0);
+ *
+ *
+ * Verifying a password:
+ *
+ *	int ret;
+ *
+ *      ret = bcrypt_checkpw("thepassword", "expectedhash");
+ *      assert(ret != -1);
+ *
+ *	if (ret == 0) {
+ *		printf("The password matches\n");
+ *	} else {
+ *		printf("The password does NOT match\n");
+ *	}
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif

libs/libbcrypt/crypt_blowfish/LINKS

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+New versions of this package (crypt_blowfish):
+
+	http://www.openwall.com/crypt/
+
+A paper on the algorithm that explains its design decisions:
+
+	http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix99/provos.html
+
+Unix Seventh Edition Manual, Volume 2: the password scheme (1978):
+
+	http://plan9.bell-labs.com/7thEdMan/vol2/password
+
+The Openwall GNU/*/Linux (Owl) tcb suite implementing the alternative
+password shadowing scheme.  This includes a PAM module which
+supersedes pam_unix and uses the password hashing framework provided
+with crypt_blowfish when setting new passwords.
+
+	http://www.openwall.com/tcb/
+
+pam_passwdqc, a password strength checking and policy enforcement
+module for PAM-aware password changing programs:
+
+	http://www.openwall.com/passwdqc/
+
+John the Ripper password cracker:
+
+	http://www.openwall.com/john/
+
+$Owl: Owl/packages/glibc/crypt_blowfish/LINKS,v 1.4 2005/11/16 13:09:47 solar Exp $

libs/libbcrypt/crypt_blowfish/Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+#
+# Written and revised by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011.
+# No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
+# domain.  In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
+# in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
+# Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
+# general public under the following terms:
+#
+# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+# modification, are permitted.
+#
+# There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
+#
+# See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
+#
+
+CC = gcc
+AS = $(CC)
+LD = $(CC)
+RM = rm -f
+CFLAGS = -W -Wall -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wcast-qual -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes -Wshadow -Wundef -Wpointer-arith -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -funroll-loops
+ASFLAGS = -c
+LDFLAGS = -s
+
+BLOWFISH_OBJS = \
+	crypt_blowfish.o x86.o
+
+CRYPT_OBJS = \
+	$(BLOWFISH_OBJS) crypt_gensalt.o wrapper.o
+
+TEST_OBJS = \
+	$(BLOWFISH_OBJS) crypt_gensalt.o crypt_test.o
+
+TEST_THREADS_OBJS = \
+	$(BLOWFISH_OBJS) crypt_gensalt.o crypt_test_threads.o
+
+EXTRA_MANS = \
+	crypt_r.3 crypt_rn.3 crypt_ra.3 \
+	crypt_gensalt.3 crypt_gensalt_rn.3 crypt_gensalt_ra.3
+
+all: $(CRYPT_OBJS) man
+
+check: crypt_test
+	./crypt_test
+
+crypt_test: $(TEST_OBJS)
+	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS) $(TEST_OBJS) -o $@
+
+crypt_test.o: wrapper.c ow-crypt.h crypt_blowfish.h crypt_gensalt.h
+	$(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) wrapper.c -DTEST -o $@
+
+check_threads: crypt_test_threads
+	./crypt_test_threads
+
+crypt_test_threads: $(TEST_THREADS_OBJS)
+	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS) $(TEST_THREADS_OBJS) -lpthread -o $@
+
+crypt_test_threads.o: wrapper.c ow-crypt.h crypt_blowfish.h crypt_gensalt.h
+	$(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) wrapper.c -DTEST -DTEST_THREADS=4 -o $@
+
+man: $(EXTRA_MANS)
+
+$(EXTRA_MANS):
+	echo '.so man3/crypt.3' > $@
+
+crypt_blowfish.o: crypt_blowfish.h
+crypt_gensalt.o: crypt_gensalt.h
+wrapper.o: crypt.h ow-crypt.h crypt_blowfish.h crypt_gensalt.h
+
+.c.o:
+	$(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) $*.c
+
+.S.o:
+	$(AS) $(ASFLAGS) $*.S
+
+clean:
+	$(RM) crypt_test crypt_test_threads *.o $(EXTRA_MANS) core

libs/libbcrypt/crypt_blowfish/PERFORMANCE

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+These numbers are for 32 iterations ("$2a$05"):
+
+			OpenBSD 3.0 bcrypt(*)	crypt_blowfish 0.4.4
+Pentium III, 840 MHz	99 c/s			121 c/s (+22%)
+Alpha 21164PC, 533 MHz	55.5 c/s		76.9 c/s (+38%)
+UltraSparc IIi, 400 MHz	49.9 c/s		52.5 c/s (+5%)
+Pentium, 120 MHz	8.8 c/s			20.1 c/s (+128%)
+PA-RISC 7100LC, 80 MHz	8.5 c/s			16.3 c/s (+92%)
+
+(*) built with -fomit-frame-pointer -funroll-loops, which I don't
+think happens for libcrypt.
+
+Starting with version 1.1 released in June 2011, default builds of
+crypt_blowfish invoke a quick self-test on every hash computation.
+This has roughly a 4.8% performance impact at "$2a$05", but only a 0.6%
+impact at a more typical setting of "$2a$08".
+
+The large speedup for the original Pentium is due to the assembly
+code and the weird optimizations this processor requires.
+
+The numbers for password cracking are 2 to 10% higher than those for
+crypt_blowfish as certain things may be done out of the loop and the
+code doesn't need to be reentrant.
+
+Recent versions of John the Ripper (1.6.25-dev and newer) achieve an
+additional 15% speedup on the Pentium Pro family of processors (which
+includes Pentium III) with a separate version of the assembly code and
+run-time CPU detection.
+
+$Owl: Owl/packages/glibc/crypt_blowfish/PERFORMANCE,v 1.6 2011/06/21 12:09:20 solar Exp $

libs/libbcrypt/crypt_blowfish/README

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+This is an implementation of a password hashing method, provided via the
+crypt(3) and a reentrant interface.  It is fully compatible with
+OpenBSD's bcrypt.c for prefix "$2b$", originally by Niels Provos and
+David Mazieres.  (Please refer to the included crypt(3) man page for
+information on minor compatibility issues for other bcrypt prefixes.)
+
+I've placed this code in the public domain, with fallback to a
+permissive license.  Please see the comment in crypt_blowfish.c for
+more information.
+
+You can use the provided routines in your own packages, or link them
+into a C library.  I've provided hooks for linking into GNU libc, but
+it shouldn't be too hard to get this into another C library.  Note
+that simply adding this code into your libc is probably not enough to
+make your system use the new password hashing algorithm.  Changes to
+passwd(1), PAM modules, or whatever else your system uses will likely
+be needed as well.  These are not a part of this package, but see
+LINKS for a pointer to our tcb suite.
+
+Instructions on using the routines in one of the two common ways are
+given below.  It is recommended that you test the routines on your
+system before you start.  Type "make check" or "make check_threads"
+(if you have the POSIX threads library), then "make clean".
+
+
+1. Using the routines in your programs.
+
+The available interfaces are in ow-crypt.h, and this is the file you
+should include.  You won't need crypt.h.  When linking, add all of the
+C files and x86.S (you can compile and link it even on a non-x86, it
+will produce no code in this case).
+
+
+2. Building the routines into GNU C library.
+
+For versions 2.13 and 2.14 (and likely other nearby ones), extract the
+library sources as usual.  Apply the patch for glibc 2.14 provided in
+this package.  Enter crypt/ and rename crypt.h to gnu-crypt.h within
+that directory.  Copy the C sources, header, and assembly (x86.S) files
+from this package in there as well (but be sure you don't overwrite the
+Makefile).  Configure, build, and install the library as usual.
+
+For versions 2.2 to 2.3.6 (and likely also for some newer ones),
+extract the library sources and maybe its optional add-ons as usual.
+Apply the patch for glibc 2.3.6 provided in this package.  Enter
+crypt/ and rename crypt.h to gnu-crypt.h within that directory.  Copy
+the C sources, header, and assembly (x86.S) files from this package in
+there as well (but be sure you don't overwrite the Makefile).
+Configure, build, and install the library as usual.
+
+For versions 2.1 to 2.1.3, extract the library sources and the crypt
+and linuxthreads add-ons as usual.  Apply the patch for glibc 2.1.3
+provided in this package.  Enter crypt/sysdeps/unix/, and rename
+crypt.h to gnu-crypt.h within that directory.  Copy C sources, header,
+and assembly (x86.S) files from this package in there as well (but be
+sure you don't overwrite the Makefile).  Configure, build, and install
+the library as usual.
+
+Programs that want to use the provided interfaces will need to include
+crypt.h (but not ow-crypt.h directly).  By default, prototypes for the
+new routines aren't defined (but the extra functionality of crypt(3)
+is indeed available).  You need to define _OW_SOURCE to obtain the new
+routines as well.
+
+-- 
+Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com>
+
+$Owl: Owl/packages/glibc/crypt_blowfish/README,v 1.10 2014/07/07 15:19:04 solar Exp $

libs/libbcrypt/crypt_blowfish/crypt.3

@@ -0,0 +1,575 @@
+.\" Written and revised by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011.
+.\" No copyright is claimed, and this man page is hereby placed in the public
+.\" domain.  In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the man page
+.\" in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the man page is
+.\" Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
+.\" general public under the following terms:
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted.
+.\"
+.\" There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
+.\"
+.\" This manual page in its current form is intended for use on systems
+.\" based on the GNU C Library with crypt_blowfish patched into libcrypt.
+.\"
+.TH CRYPT 3 "July 7, 2014" "Openwall Project" "Library functions"
+.ad l
+.\" No macros in NAME to keep makewhatis happy.
+.SH NAME
+\fBcrypt\fR, \fBcrypt_r\fR, \fBcrypt_rn\fR, \fBcrypt_ra\fR,
+\fBcrypt_gensalt\fR, \fBcrypt_gensalt_rn\fR, \fBcrypt_gensalt_ra\fR
+\- password hashing
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.B #define _XOPEN_SOURCE
+.br
+.B #include <unistd.h>
+.sp
+.in +8
+.ti -8
+.BI "char *crypt(const char *" key ", const char *" setting );
+.in -8
+.sp
+.B #define _GNU_SOURCE
+.br
+.B #include <crypt.h>
+.sp
+.in +8
+.ti -8
+.BI "char *crypt_r(const char *" key ", const char *" setting ", struct crypt_data *" data );
+.in -8
+.sp
+.B #define _OW_SOURCE
+.br
+.B #include <crypt.h>
+.sp
+.in +8
+.ti -8
+.BI "char *crypt_rn(const char *" key ", const char *" setting ", void *" data ", int " size );
+.ti -8
+.BI "char *crypt_ra(const char *" key ", const char *" setting ", void **" data ", int *" size );
+.ti -8
+.BI "char *crypt_gensalt(const char *" prefix ", unsigned long " count ", const char *" input ", int " size );
+.ti -8
+.BI "char *crypt_gensalt_rn(const char *" prefix ", unsigned long " count ", const char *" input ", int " size ", char *" output ", int " output_size );
+.ti -8
+.BI "char *crypt_gensalt_ra(const char *" prefix ", unsigned long " count ", const char *" input ", int " size );
+.ad b
+.de crypt
+.BR crypt ,
+.BR crypt_r ,
+.BR crypt_rn ", \\$1"
+.ie "\\$2"" .B crypt_ra
+.el .BR crypt_ra "\\$2"
+..
+.de crypt_gensalt
+.BR crypt_gensalt ,
+.BR crypt_gensalt_rn ", \\$1"
+.ie "\\$2"" .B crypt_gensalt_ra
+.el .BR crypt_gensalt_ra "\\$2"
+..
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+The
+.crypt and
+functions calculate a cryptographic hash function of
+.I key
+with one of a number of supported methods as requested with
+.IR setting ,
+which is also used to pass a salt and possibly other parameters to
+the chosen method.
+The hashing methods are explained below.
+.PP
+Unlike
+.BR crypt ,
+the functions
+.BR crypt_r ,
+.BR crypt_rn " and"
+.B crypt_ra
+are reentrant.
+They place their result and possibly their private data in a
+.I data
+area of
+.I size
+bytes as passed to them by an application and/or in memory they
+allocate dynamically.  Some hashing algorithms may use the data area to
+cache precomputed intermediate values across calls.  Thus, applications
+must properly initialize the data area before its first use.
+.B crypt_r
+requires that only
+.I data->initialized
+be reset to zero;
+.BR crypt_rn " and " crypt_ra
+require that either the entire data area is zeroed or, in the case of
+.BR crypt_ra ,
+.I *data
+is NULL.  When called with a NULL
+.I *data
+or insufficient
+.I *size
+for the requested hashing algorithm,
+.B crypt_ra
+uses
+.BR realloc (3)
+to allocate the required amount of memory dynamically.  Thus,
+.B crypt_ra
+has the additional requirement that
+.IR *data ,
+when non-NULL, must point to an area allocated either with a previous
+call to
+.B crypt_ra
+or with a
+.BR malloc (3)
+family call.
+The memory allocated by
+.B crypt_ra
+should be freed with
+.BR free "(3)."
+.PP
+The
+.crypt_gensalt and
+functions compile a string for use as
+.I setting
+\- with the given
+.I prefix
+(used to choose a hashing method), the iteration
+.I count
+(if supported by the chosen method) and up to
+.I size
+cryptographically random
+.I input
+bytes for use as the actual salt.
+If
+.I count
+is 0, a low default will be picked.
+The random bytes may be obtained from
+.BR /dev/urandom .
+Unlike
+.BR crypt_gensalt ,
+the functions
+.BR crypt_gensalt_rn " and " crypt_gensalt_ra
+are reentrant.
+.B crypt_gensalt_rn
+places its result in the
+.I output
+buffer of
+.I output_size
+bytes.
+.B crypt_gensalt_ra
+allocates memory for its result dynamically.  The memory should be
+freed with
+.BR free "(3)."
+.SH RETURN VALUE
+Upon successful completion, the functions
+.crypt and
+return a pointer to a string containing the setting that was actually used
+and a printable encoding of the hash function value.
+The entire string is directly usable as
+.I setting
+with other calls to
+.crypt and
+and as
+.I prefix
+with calls to
+.crypt_gensalt and .
+.PP
+The behavior of
+.B crypt
+on errors isn't well standardized.  Some implementations simply can't fail
+(unless the process dies, in which case they obviously can't return),
+others return NULL or a fixed string.  Most implementations don't set
+.IR errno ,
+but some do.  SUSv2 specifies only returning NULL and setting
+.I errno
+as a valid behavior, and defines only one possible error
+.RB "(" ENOSYS ,
+"The functionality is not supported on this implementation.")
+Unfortunately, most existing applications aren't prepared to handle
+NULL returns from
+.BR crypt .
+The description below corresponds to this implementation of
+.BR crypt " and " crypt_r
+only, and to
+.BR crypt_rn " and " crypt_ra .
+The behavior may change to match standards, other implementations or
+existing applications.
+.PP
+.BR crypt " and " crypt_r
+may only fail (and return) when passed an invalid or unsupported
+.IR setting ,
+in which case they return a pointer to a magic string that is
+shorter than 13 characters and is guaranteed to differ from
+.IR setting .
+This behavior is safe for older applications which assume that
+.B crypt
+can't fail, when both setting new passwords and authenticating against
+existing password hashes.
+.BR crypt_rn " and " crypt_ra
+return NULL to indicate failure.  All four functions set
+.I errno
+when they fail.
+.PP
+The functions
+.crypt_gensalt and
+return a pointer to the compiled string for
+.IR setting ,
+or NULL on error in which case
+.I errno
+is set.
+.SH ERRORS
+.TP
+.B EINVAL
+.crypt "" :
+.I setting
+is invalid or not supported by this implementation;
+.sp
+.crypt_gensalt "" :
+.I prefix
+is invalid or not supported by this implementation;
+.I count
+is invalid for the requested
+.IR prefix ;
+the input
+.I size
+is insufficient for the smallest valid salt with the requested
+.IR prefix ;
+.I input
+is NULL.
+.TP
+.B ERANGE
+.BR crypt_rn :
+the provided data area
+.I size
+is insufficient for the requested hashing algorithm;
+.sp
+.BR crypt_gensalt_rn :
+.I output_size
+is too small to hold the compiled
+.I setting
+string.
+.TP
+.B ENOMEM
+.B crypt
+(original glibc only):
+failed to allocate memory for the output buffer (which subsequent calls
+would re-use);
+.sp
+.BR crypt_ra :
+.I *data
+is NULL or
+.I *size
+is insufficient for the requested hashing algorithm and
+.BR realloc (3)
+failed;
+.sp
+.BR crypt_gensalt_ra :
+failed to allocate memory for the compiled
+.I setting
+string.
+.TP
+.B ENOSYS
+.B crypt
+(SUSv2):
+the functionality is not supported on this implementation;
+.sp
+.BR crypt ,
+.B crypt_r
+(glibc 2.0 to 2.0.1 only):
+.de no-crypt-add-on
+the crypt add-on is not compiled in and
+.I setting
+requests something other than the MD5-based algorithm.
+..
+.no-crypt-add-on
+.TP
+.B EOPNOTSUPP
+.BR crypt ,
+.B crypt_r
+(glibc 2.0.2 to 2.1.3 only):
+.no-crypt-add-on
+.SH HASHING METHODS
+The implemented hashing methods are intended specifically for processing
+user passwords for storage and authentication;
+they are at best inefficient for most other purposes.
+.PP
+It is important to understand that password hashing is not a replacement
+for strong passwords.
+It is always possible for an attacker with access to password hashes
+to try guessing candidate passwords against the hashes.
+There are, however, certain properties a password hashing method may have
+which make these key search attacks somewhat harder.
+.PP
+All of the hashing methods use salts such that the same
+.I key
+may produce many possible hashes.
+Proper use of salts may defeat a number of attacks, including:
+.TP
+1.
+The ability to try candidate passwords against multiple hashes at the
+price of one.
+.TP
+2.
+The use of pre-hashed lists of candidate passwords.
+.TP
+3.
+The ability to determine whether two users (or two accounts of one user)
+have the same or different passwords without actually having to guess
+one of the passwords.
+.PP
+The key search attacks depend on computing hashes of large numbers of
+candidate passwords.
+Thus, the computational cost of a good password hashing method must be
+high \- but of course not too high to render it impractical.
+.PP
+All hashing methods implemented within the
+.crypt and
+interfaces use multiple iterations of an underlying cryptographic
+primitive specifically in order to increase the cost of trying a
+candidate password.
+Unfortunately, due to hardware improvements, the hashing methods which
+have a fixed cost become increasingly less secure over time.
+.PP
+In addition to salts, modern password hashing methods accept a variable
+iteration
+.IR count .
+This makes it possible to adapt their cost to the hardware improvements
+while still maintaining compatibility.
+.PP
+The following hashing methods are or may be implemented within the
+described interfaces:
+.PP
+.de hash
+.ad l
+.TP
+.I prefix
+.ie "\\$1"" \{\
+"" (empty string);
+.br
+a string matching ^[./0-9A-Za-z]{2} (see
+.BR regex (7))
+.\}
+.el "\\$1"
+.TP
+.B Encoding syntax
+\\$2
+.TP
+.B Maximum password length
+\\$3 (uses \\$4-bit characters)
+.TP
+.B Effective key size
+.ie "\\$5"" limited by the hash size only
+.el up to \\$5 bits
+.TP
+.B Hash size
+\\$6 bits
+.TP
+.B Salt size
+\\$7 bits
+.TP
+.B Iteration count
+\\$8
+.ad b
+..
+.ti -2
+.B Traditional DES-based
+.br
+This method is supported by almost all implementations of
+.BR crypt .
+Unfortunately, it no longer offers adequate security because of its many
+limitations.
+Thus, it should not be used for new passwords unless you absolutely have
+to be able to migrate the password hashes to other systems.
+.hash "" "[./0-9A-Za-z]{13}" 8 7 56 64 12 25
+.PP
+.ti -2
+.B Extended BSDI-style DES-based
+.br
+This method is used on BSDI and is also available on at least NetBSD,
+OpenBSD, and FreeBSD due to the use of David Burren's FreeSec library.
+.hash _ "_[./0-9A-Za-z]{19}" unlimited 7 56 64 24 "1 to 2**24-1 (must be odd)"
+.PP
+.ti -2
+.B FreeBSD-style MD5-based
+.br
+This is Poul-Henning Kamp's MD5-based password hashing method originally
+developed for FreeBSD.
+It is currently supported on many free Unix-like systems, on Solaris 10
+and newer, and it is part of the official glibc.
+Its main disadvantage is the fixed iteration count, which is already
+too low for the currently available hardware.
+.hash "$1$" "\e$1\e$[^$]{1,8}\e$[./0-9A-Za-z]{22}" unlimited 8 "" 128 "6 to 48" 1000
+.PP
+.ti -2
+.BR "OpenBSD-style Blowfish-based" " (" bcrypt )
+.br
+.B bcrypt
+was originally developed by Niels Provos and David Mazieres for OpenBSD
+and is also supported on recent versions of FreeBSD and NetBSD,
+on Solaris 10 and newer, and on several GNU/*/Linux distributions.
+It is, however, not part of the official glibc.
+.PP
+While both
+.B bcrypt
+and the BSDI-style DES-based hashing offer a variable iteration count,
+.B bcrypt
+may scale to even faster hardware, doesn't allow for certain optimizations
+specific to password cracking only, doesn't have the effective key size
+limitation, and uses 8-bit characters in passwords.
+.hash "$2b$" "\e$2[abxy]\e$[0-9]{2}\e$[./A-Za-z0-9]{53}" 72 8 "" 184 128 "2**4 to 2**99 (current implementations are limited to 2**31 iterations)"
+.PP
+With
+.BR bcrypt ,
+the
+.I count
+passed to
+.crypt_gensalt and
+is the base-2 logarithm of the actual iteration count.
+.PP
+.B bcrypt
+hashes used the "$2a$" prefix since 1997.
+However, in 2011 an implementation bug was discovered in crypt_blowfish
+(versions up to 1.0.4 inclusive) affecting handling of password characters with
+the 8th bit set.
+Besides fixing the bug,
+to provide for upgrade strategies for existing systems, two new prefixes were
+introduced: "$2x$", which fully re-introduces the bug, and "$2y$", which
+guarantees correct handling of both 7- and 8-bit characters.
+OpenBSD 5.5 introduced the "$2b$" prefix for behavior that exactly matches
+crypt_blowfish's "$2y$", and current crypt_blowfish supports it as well.
+Unfortunately, the behavior of "$2a$" on password characters with the 8th bit
+set has to be considered system-specific.
+When generating new password hashes, the "$2b$" or "$2y$" prefix should be used.
+(If such hashes ever need to be migrated to a system that does not yet support
+these new prefixes, the prefix in migrated copies of the already-generated
+hashes may be changed to "$2a$".)
+.PP
+.crypt_gensalt and
+support the "$2b$", "$2y$", and "$2a$" prefixes (the latter for legacy programs
+or configurations), but not "$2x$" (which must not be used for new hashes).
+.crypt and
+support all four of these prefixes.
+.SH PORTABILITY NOTES
+Programs using any of these functions on a glibc 2.x system must be
+linked against
+.BR libcrypt .
+However, many Unix-like operating systems and older versions of the
+GNU C Library include the
+.BR crypt " function in " libc .
+.PP
+The
+.BR crypt_r ,
+.BR crypt_rn ,
+.BR crypt_ra ,
+.crypt_gensalt and
+functions are very non-portable.
+.PP
+The set of supported hashing methods is implementation-dependent.
+.SH CONFORMING TO
+The
+.B crypt
+function conforms to SVID, X/OPEN, and is available on BSD 4.3.
+The strings returned by
+.B crypt
+are not required to be portable among conformant systems.
+.PP
+.B crypt_r
+is a GNU extension.
+There's also a
+.B crypt_r
+function on HP-UX and MKS Toolkit, but the prototypes and semantics differ.
+.PP
+.B crypt_gensalt
+is an Openwall extension.
+There's also a
+.B crypt_gensalt
+function on Solaris 10 and newer, but the prototypes and semantics differ.
+.PP
+.BR crypt_rn ,
+.BR crypt_ra ,
+.BR crypt_gensalt_rn ,
+and
+.B crypt_gensalt_ra
+are Openwall extensions.
+.SH HISTORY
+A rotor-based
+.B crypt
+function appeared in Version 6 AT&T UNIX.
+The "traditional"
+.B crypt
+first appeared in Version 7 AT&T UNIX.
+.PP
+The
+.B crypt_r
+function was introduced during glibc 2.0 development.
+.SH BUGS
+The return values of
+.BR crypt " and " crypt_gensalt
+point to static buffers that are overwritten by subsequent calls.
+These functions are not thread-safe.
+.RB ( crypt
+on recent versions of Solaris uses thread-specific data and actually is
+thread-safe.)
+.PP
+The strings returned by certain other implementations of
+.B crypt
+on error may be stored in read-only locations or only initialized once,
+which makes it unsafe to always attempt to zero out the buffer normally
+pointed to by the
+.B crypt
+return value as it would otherwise be preferable for security reasons.
+The problem could be avoided with the use of
+.BR crypt_r ,
+.BR crypt_rn ,
+or
+.B crypt_ra
+where the application has full control over output buffers of these functions
+(and often over some of their private data as well).
+Unfortunately, the functions aren't (yet?) available on platforms where
+.B crypt
+has this undesired property.
+.PP
+Applications using the thread-safe
+.B crypt_r
+need to allocate address space for the large (over 128 KB)
+.I struct crypt_data
+structure.  Each thread needs a separate instance of the structure.  The
+.B crypt_r
+interface makes it impossible to implement a hashing algorithm which
+would need to keep an even larger amount of private data, without breaking
+binary compatibility.
+.B crypt_ra
+allows for dynamically increasing the allocation size as required by the
+hashing algorithm that is actually used.  Unfortunately,
+.B crypt_ra
+is even more non-portable than
+.BR crypt_r .
+.PP
+Multi-threaded applications or library functions which are meant to be
+thread-safe should use
+.BR crypt_gensalt_rn " or " crypt_gensalt_ra
+rather than
+.BR crypt_gensalt .
+.SH SEE ALSO
+.BR login (1),
+.BR passwd (1),
+.BR crypto (3),
+.BR encrypt (3),
+.BR free (3),
+.BR getpass (3),
+.BR getpwent (3),
+.BR malloc (3),
+.BR realloc (3),
+.BR shadow (3),
+.BR passwd (5),
+.BR shadow (5),
+.BR regex (7),
+.BR pam (8)
+.sp
+Niels Provos and David Mazieres.  A Future-Adaptable Password Scheme.
+Proceedings of the 1999 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, June 1999.
+.br
+http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix99/provos.html
+.sp
+Robert Morris and Ken Thompson.  Password Security: A Case History.
+Unix Seventh Edition Manual, Volume 2, April 1978.
+.br
+http://plan9.bell-labs.com/7thEdMan/vol2/password

libs/libbcrypt/crypt_blowfish/crypt.h

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2002.
+ * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
+ * domain.  In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
+ * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
+ * general public under the following terms:
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted.
+ *
+ * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
+ *
+ * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
+ */
+
+#include <gnu-crypt.h>
+
+#if defined(_OW_SOURCE) || defined(__USE_OW)
+#define __SKIP_GNU
+#undef __SKIP_OW
+#include <ow-crypt.h>
+#undef __SKIP_GNU
+#endif

libs/libbcrypt/crypt_blowfish/crypt_blowfish.c

@@ -0,0 +1,907 @@
+/*
+ * The crypt_blowfish homepage is:
+ *
+ *	http://www.openwall.com/crypt/
+ *
+ * This code comes from John the Ripper password cracker, with reentrant
+ * and crypt(3) interfaces added, but optimizations specific to password
+ * cracking removed.
+ *
+ * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 1998-2014.
+ * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
+ * domain.  In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
+ * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2014 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
+ * general public under the following terms:
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted.
+ *
+ * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
+ *
+ * It is my intent that you should be able to use this on your system,
+ * as part of a software package, or anywhere else to improve security,
+ * ensure compatibility, or for any other purpose.  I would appreciate
+ * it if you give credit where it is due and keep your modifications in
+ * the public domain as well, but I don't require that in order to let
+ * you place this code and any modifications you make under a license
+ * of your choice.
+ *
+ * This implementation is fully compatible with OpenBSD's bcrypt.c for prefix
+ * "$2b$", originally by Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>, and it uses
+ * some of his ideas.  The password hashing algorithm was designed by David
+ * Mazieres <dm at lcs.mit.edu>.  For information on the level of
+ * compatibility for bcrypt hash prefixes other than "$2b$", please refer to
+ * the comments in BF_set_key() below and to the included crypt(3) man page.
+ *
+ * There's a paper on the algorithm that explains its design decisions:
+ *
+ *	http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix99/provos.html
+ *
+ * Some of the tricks in BF_ROUND might be inspired by Eric Young's
+ * Blowfish library (I can't be sure if I would think of something if I
+ * hadn't seen his code).
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifndef __set_errno
+#define __set_errno(val) errno = (val)
+#endif
+
+/* Just to make sure the prototypes match the actual definitions */
+#include "crypt_blowfish.h"
+
+#ifdef __i386__
+#define BF_ASM				1
+#define BF_SCALE			1
+#elif defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__alpha__) || defined(__hppa__)
+#define BF_ASM				0
+#define BF_SCALE			1
+#else
+#define BF_ASM				0
+#define BF_SCALE			0
+#endif
+
+typedef unsigned int BF_word;
+typedef signed int BF_word_signed;
+
+/* Number of Blowfish rounds, this is also hardcoded into a few places */
+#define BF_N				16
+
+typedef BF_word BF_key[BF_N + 2];
+
+typedef struct {
+	BF_word S[4][0x100];
+	BF_key P;
+} BF_ctx;
+
+/*
+ * Magic IV for 64 Blowfish encryptions that we do at the end.
+ * The string is "OrpheanBeholderScryDoubt" on big-endian.
+ */
+static BF_word BF_magic_w[6] = {
+	0x4F727068, 0x65616E42, 0x65686F6C,
+	0x64657253, 0x63727944, 0x6F756274
+};
+
+/*
+ * P-box and S-box tables initialized with digits of Pi.
+ */
+static BF_ctx BF_init_state = {
+	{
+		{
+			0xd1310ba6, 0x98dfb5ac, 0x2ffd72db, 0xd01adfb7,
+			0xb8e1afed, 0x6a267e96, 0xba7c9045, 0xf12c7f99,
+			0x24a19947, 0xb3916cf7, 0x0801f2e2, 0x858efc16,
+			0x636920d8, 0x71574e69, 0xa458fea3, 0xf4933d7e,
+			0x0d95748f, 0x728eb658, 0x718bcd58, 0x82154aee,
+			0x7b54a41d, 0xc25a59b5, 0x9c30d539, 0x2af26013,
+			0xc5d1b023, 0x286085f0, 0xca417918, 0xb8db38ef,
+			0x8e79dcb0, 0x603a180e, 0x6c9e0e8b, 0xb01e8a3e,
+			0xd71577c1, 0xbd314b27, 0x78af2fda, 0x55605c60,
+			0xe65525f3, 0xaa55ab94, 0x57489862, 0x63e81440,
+			0x55ca396a, 0x2aab10b6, 0xb4cc5c34, 0x1141e8ce,
+			0xa15486af, 0x7c72e993, 0xb3ee1411, 0x636fbc2a,
+			0x2ba9c55d, 0x741831f6, 0xce5c3e16, 0x9b87931e,
+			0xafd6ba33, 0x6c24cf5c, 0x7a325381, 0x28958677,
+			0x3b8f4898, 0x6b4bb9af, 0xc4bfe81b, 0x66282193,
+			0x61d809cc, 0xfb21a991, 0x487cac60, 0x5dec8032,
+			0xef845d5d, 0xe98575b1, 0xdc262302, 0xeb651b88,
+			0x23893e81, 0xd396acc5, 0x0f6d6ff3, 0x83f44239,
+			0x2e0b4482, 0xa4842004, 0x69c8f04a, 0x9e1f9b5e,
+			0x21c66842, 0xf6e96c9a, 0x670c9c61, 0xabd388f0,
+			0x6a51a0d2, 0xd8542f68, 0x960fa728, 0xab5133a3,
+			0x6eef0b6c, 0x137a3be4, 0xba3bf050, 0x7efb2a98,
+			0xa1f1651d, 0x39af0176, 0x66ca593e, 0x82430e88,
+			0x8cee8619, 0x456f9fb4, 0x7d84a5c3, 0x3b8b5ebe,
+			0xe06f75d8, 0x85c12073, 0x401a449f, 0x56c16aa6,
+			0x4ed3aa62, 0x363f7706, 0x1bfedf72, 0x429b023d,
+			0x37d0d724, 0xd00a1248, 0xdb0fead3, 0x49f1c09b,
+			0x075372c9, 0x80991b7b, 0x25d479d8, 0xf6e8def7,
+			0xe3fe501a, 0xb6794c3b, 0x976ce0bd, 0x04c006ba,
+			0xc1a94fb6, 0x409f60c4, 0x5e5c9ec2, 0x196a2463,
+			0x68fb6faf, 0x3e6c53b5, 0x1339b2eb, 0x3b52ec6f,
+			0x6dfc511f, 0x9b30952c, 0xcc814544, 0xaf5ebd09,
+			0xbee3d004, 0xde334afd, 0x660f2807, 0x192e4bb3,
+			0xc0cba857, 0x45c8740f, 0xd20b5f39, 0xb9d3fbdb,
+			0x5579c0bd, 0x1a60320a, 0xd6a100c6, 0x402c7279,
+			0x679f25fe, 0xfb1fa3cc, 0x8ea5e9f8, 0xdb3222f8,
+			0x3c7516df, 0xfd616b15, 0x2f501ec8, 0xad0552ab,
+			0x323db5fa, 0xfd238760, 0x53317b48, 0x3e00df82,
+			0x9e5c57bb, 0xca6f8ca0, 0x1a87562e, 0xdf1769db,
+			0xd542a8f6, 0x287effc3, 0xac6732c6, 0x8c4f5573,
+			0x695b27b0, 0xbbca58c8, 0xe1ffa35d, 0xb8f011a0,
+			0x10fa3d98, 0xfd2183b8, 0x4afcb56c, 0x2dd1d35b,
+			0x9a53e479, 0xb6f84565, 0xd28e49bc, 0x4bfb9790,
+			0xe1ddf2da, 0xa4cb7e33, 0x62fb1341, 0xcee4c6e8,
+			0xef20cada, 0x36774c01, 0xd07e9efe, 0x2bf11fb4,
+			0x95dbda4d, 0xae909198, 0xeaad8e71, 0x6b93d5a0,
+			0xd08ed1d0, 0xafc725e0, 0x8e3c5b2f, 0x8e7594b7,
+			0x8ff6e2fb, 0xf2122b64, 0x8888b812, 0x900df01c,
+			0x4fad5ea0, 0x688fc31c, 0xd1cff191, 0xb3a8c1ad,
+			0x2f2f2218, 0xbe0e1777, 0xea752dfe, 0x8b021fa1,
+			0xe5a0cc0f, 0xb56f74e8, 0x18acf3d6, 0xce89e299,
+			0xb4a84fe0, 0xfd13e0b7, 0x7cc43b81, 0xd2ada8d9,
+			0x165fa266, 0x80957705, 0x93cc7314, 0x211a1477,
+			0xe6ad2065, 0x77b5fa86, 0xc75442f5, 0xfb9d35cf,
+			0xebcdaf0c, 0x7b3e89a0, 0xd6411bd3, 0xae1e7e49,
+			0x00250e2d, 0x2071b35e, 0x226800bb, 0x57b8e0af,
+			0x2464369b, 0xf009b91e, 0x5563911d, 0x59dfa6aa,
+			0x78c14389, 0xd95a537f, 0x207d5ba2, 0x02e5b9c5,
+			0x83260376, 0x6295cfa9, 0x11c81968, 0x4e734a41,
+			0xb3472dca, 0x7b14a94a, 0x1b510052, 0x9a532915,
+			0xd60f573f, 0xbc9bc6e4, 0x2b60a476, 0x81e67400,
+			0x08ba6fb5, 0x571be91f, 0xf296ec6b, 0x2a0dd915,
+			0xb6636521, 0xe7b9f9b6, 0xff34052e, 0xc5855664,
+			0x53b02d5d, 0xa99f8fa1, 0x08ba4799, 0x6e85076a
+		}, {
+			0x4b7a70e9, 0xb5b32944, 0xdb75092e, 0xc4192623,
+			0xad6ea6b0, 0x49a7df7d, 0x9cee60b8, 0x8fedb266,
+			0xecaa8c71, 0x699a17ff, 0x5664526c, 0xc2b19ee1,
+			0x193602a5, 0x75094c29, 0xa0591340, 0xe4183a3e,
+			0x3f54989a, 0x5b429d65, 0x6b8fe4d6, 0x99f73fd6,
+			0xa1d29c07, 0xefe830f5, 0x4d2d38e6, 0xf0255dc1,
+			0x4cdd2086, 0x8470eb26, 0x6382e9c6, 0x021ecc5e,
+			0x09686b3f, 0x3ebaefc9, 0x3c971814, 0x6b6a70a1,
+			0x687f3584, 0x52a0e286, 0xb79c5305, 0xaa500737,
+			0x3e07841c, 0x7fdeae5c, 0x8e7d44ec, 0x5716f2b8,
+			0xb03ada37, 0xf0500c0d, 0xf01c1f04, 0x0200b3ff,
+			0xae0cf51a, 0x3cb574b2, 0x25837a58, 0xdc0921bd,
+			0xd19113f9, 0x7ca92ff6, 0x94324773, 0x22f54701,
+			0x3ae5e581, 0x37c2dadc, 0xc8b57634, 0x9af3dda7,
+			0xa9446146, 0x0fd0030e, 0xecc8c73e, 0xa4751e41,
+			0xe238cd99, 0x3bea0e2f, 0x3280bba1, 0x183eb331,
+			0x4e548b38, 0x4f6db908, 0x6f420d03, 0xf60a04bf,
+			0x2cb81290, 0x24977c79, 0x5679b072, 0xbcaf89af,
+			0xde9a771f, 0xd9930810, 0xb38bae12, 0xdccf3f2e,
+			0x5512721f, 0x2e6b7124, 0x501adde6, 0x9f84cd87,
+			0x7a584718, 0x7408da17, 0xbc9f9abc, 0xe94b7d8c,
+			0xec7aec3a, 0xdb851dfa, 0x63094366, 0xc464c3d2,
+			0xef1c1847, 0x3215d908, 0xdd433b37, 0x24c2ba16,
+			0x12a14d43, 0x2a65c451, 0x50940002, 0x133ae4dd,
+			0x71dff89e, 0x10314e55, 0x81ac77d6, 0x5f11199b,
+			0x043556f1, 0xd7a3c76b, 0x3c11183b, 0x5924a509,
+			0xf28fe6ed, 0x97f1fbfa, 0x9ebabf2c, 0x1e153c6e,
+			0x86e34570, 0xeae96fb1, 0x860e5e0a, 0x5a3e2ab3,
+			0x771fe71c, 0x4e3d06fa, 0x2965dcb9, 0x99e71d0f,
+			0x803e89d6, 0x5266c825, 0x2e4cc978, 0x9c10b36a,
+			0xc6150eba, 0x94e2ea78, 0xa5fc3c53, 0x1e0a2df4,
+			0xf2f74ea7, 0x361d2b3d, 0x1939260f, 0x19c27960,
+			0x5223a708, 0xf71312b6, 0xebadfe6e, 0xeac31f66,
+			0xe3bc4595, 0xa67bc883, 0xb17f37d1, 0x018cff28,
+			0xc332ddef, 0xbe6c5aa5, 0x65582185, 0x68ab9802,
+			0xeecea50f, 0xdb2f953b, 0x2aef7dad, 0x5b6e2f84,
+			0x1521b628, 0x29076170, 0xecdd4775, 0x619f1510,
+			0x13cca830, 0xeb61bd96, 0x0334fe1e, 0xaa0363cf,
+			0xb5735c90, 0x4c70a239, 0xd59e9e0b, 0xcbaade14,
+			0xeecc86bc, 0x60622ca7, 0x9cab5cab, 0xb2f3846e,
+			0x648b1eaf, 0x19bdf0ca, 0xa02369b9, 0x655abb50,
+			0x40685a32, 0x3c2ab4b3, 0x319ee9d5, 0xc021b8f7,
+			0x9b540b19, 0x875fa099, 0x95f7997e, 0x623d7da8,
+			0xf837889a, 0x97e32d77, 0x11ed935f, 0x16681281,
+			0x0e358829, 0xc7e61fd6, 0x96dedfa1, 0x7858ba99,
+			0x57f584a5, 0x1b227263, 0x9b83c3ff, 0x1ac24696,
+			0xcdb30aeb, 0x532e3054, 0x8fd948e4, 0x6dbc3128,
+			0x58ebf2ef, 0x34c6ffea, 0xfe28ed61, 0xee7c3c73,
+			0x5d4a14d9, 0xe864b7e3, 0x42105d14, 0x203e13e0,
+			0x45eee2b6, 0xa3aaabea, 0xdb6c4f15, 0xfacb4fd0,
+			0xc742f442, 0xef6abbb5, 0x654f3b1d, 0x41cd2105,
+			0xd81e799e, 0x86854dc7, 0xe44b476a, 0x3d816250,
+			0xcf62a1f2, 0x5b8d2646, 0xfc8883a0, 0xc1c7b6a3,
+			0x7f1524c3, 0x69cb7492, 0x47848a0b, 0x5692b285,
+			0x095bbf00, 0xad19489d, 0x1462b174, 0x23820e00,
+			0x58428d2a, 0x0c55f5ea, 0x1dadf43e, 0x233f7061,
+			0x3372f092, 0x8d937e41, 0xd65fecf1, 0x6c223bdb,
+			0x7cde3759, 0xcbee7460, 0x4085f2a7, 0xce77326e,
+			0xa6078084, 0x19f8509e, 0xe8efd855, 0x61d99735,
+			0xa969a7aa, 0xc50c06c2, 0x5a04abfc, 0x800bcadc,
+			0x9e447a2e, 0xc3453484, 0xfdd56705, 0x0e1e9ec9,
+			0xdb73dbd3, 0x105588cd, 0x675fda79, 0xe3674340,
+			0xc5c43465, 0x713e38d8, 0x3d28f89e, 0xf16dff20,
+			0x153e21e7, 0x8fb03d4a, 0xe6e39f2b, 0xdb83adf7
+		}, {
+			0xe93d5a68, 0x948140f7, 0xf64c261c, 0x94692934,
+			0x411520f7, 0x7602d4f7, 0xbcf46b2e, 0xd4a20068,
+			0xd4082471, 0x3320f46a, 0x43b7d4b7, 0x500061af,
+			0x1e39f62e, 0x97244546, 0x14214f74, 0xbf8b8840,
+			0x4d95fc1d, 0x96b591af, 0x70f4ddd3, 0x66a02f45,
+			0xbfbc09ec, 0x03bd9785, 0x7fac6dd0, 0x31cb8504,
+			0x96eb27b3, 0x55fd3941, 0xda2547e6, 0xabca0a9a,
+			0x28507825, 0x530429f4, 0x0a2c86da, 0xe9b66dfb,
+			0x68dc1462, 0xd7486900, 0x680ec0a4, 0x27a18dee,
+			0x4f3ffea2, 0xe887ad8c, 0xb58ce006, 0x7af4d6b6,
+			0xaace1e7c, 0xd3375fec, 0xce78a399, 0x406b2a42,
+			0x20fe9e35, 0xd9f385b9, 0xee39d7ab, 0x3b124e8b,
+			0x1dc9faf7, 0x4b6d1856, 0x26a36631, 0xeae397b2,
+			0x3a6efa74, 0xdd5b4332, 0x6841e7f7, 0xca7820fb,
+			0xfb0af54e, 0xd8feb397, 0x454056ac, 0xba489527,
+			0x55533a3a, 0x20838d87, 0xfe6ba9b7, 0xd096954b,
+			0x55a867bc, 0xa1159a58, 0xcca92963, 0x99e1db33,
+			0xa62a4a56, 0x3f3125f9, 0x5ef47e1c, 0x9029317c,
+			0xfdf8e802, 0x04272f70, 0x80bb155c, 0x05282ce3,
+			0x95c11548, 0xe4c66d22, 0x48c1133f, 0xc70f86dc,
+			0x07f9c9ee, 0x41041f0f, 0x404779a4, 0x5d886e17,
+			0x325f51eb, 0xd59bc0d1, 0xf2bcc18f, 0x41113564,
+			0x257b7834, 0x602a9c60, 0xdff8e8a3, 0x1f636c1b,
+			0x0e12b4c2, 0x02e1329e, 0xaf664fd1, 0xcad18115,
+			0x6b2395e0, 0x333e92e1, 0x3b240b62, 0xeebeb922,
+			0x85b2a20e, 0xe6ba0d99, 0xde720c8c, 0x2da2f728,
+			0xd0127845, 0x95b794fd, 0x647d0862, 0xe7ccf5f0,
+			0x5449a36f, 0x877d48fa, 0xc39dfd27, 0xf33e8d1e,
+			0x0a476341, 0x992eff74, 0x3a6f6eab, 0xf4f8fd37,
+			0xa812dc60, 0xa1ebddf8, 0x991be14c, 0xdb6e6b0d,
+			0xc67b5510, 0x6d672c37, 0x2765d43b, 0xdcd0e804,
+			0xf1290dc7, 0xcc00ffa3, 0xb5390f92, 0x690fed0b,
+			0x667b9ffb, 0xcedb7d9c, 0xa091cf0b, 0xd9155ea3,
+			0xbb132f88, 0x515bad24, 0x7b9479bf, 0x763bd6eb,
+			0x37392eb3, 0xcc115979, 0x8026e297, 0xf42e312d,
+			0x6842ada7, 0xc66a2b3b, 0x12754ccc, 0x782ef11c,
+			0x6a124237, 0xb79251e7, 0x06a1bbe6, 0x4bfb6350,
+			0x1a6b1018, 0x11caedfa, 0x3d25bdd8, 0xe2e1c3c9,
+			0x44421659, 0x0a121386, 0xd90cec6e, 0xd5abea2a,
+			0x64af674e, 0xda86a85f, 0xbebfe988, 0x64e4c3fe,
+			0x9dbc8057, 0xf0f7c086, 0x60787bf8, 0x6003604d,
+			0xd1fd8346, 0xf6381fb0, 0x7745ae04, 0xd736fccc,
+			0x83426b33, 0xf01eab71, 0xb0804187, 0x3c005e5f,
+			0x77a057be, 0xbde8ae24, 0x55464299, 0xbf582e61,
+			0x4e58f48f, 0xf2ddfda2, 0xf474ef38, 0x8789bdc2,
+			0x5366f9c3, 0xc8b38e74, 0xb475f255, 0x46fcd9b9,
+			0x7aeb2661, 0x8b1ddf84, 0x846a0e79, 0x915f95e2,
+			0x466e598e, 0x20b45770, 0x8cd55591, 0xc902de4c,
+			0xb90bace1, 0xbb8205d0, 0x11a86248, 0x7574a99e,
+			0xb77f19b6, 0xe0a9dc09, 0x662d09a1, 0xc4324633,
+			0xe85a1f02, 0x09f0be8c, 0x4a99a025, 0x1d6efe10,
+			0x1ab93d1d, 0x0ba5a4df, 0xa186f20f, 0x2868f169,
+			0xdcb7da83, 0x573906fe, 0xa1e2ce9b, 0x4fcd7f52,
+			0x50115e01, 0xa70683fa, 0xa002b5c4, 0x0de6d027,
+			0x9af88c27, 0x773f8641, 0xc3604c06, 0x61a806b5,
+			0xf0177a28, 0xc0f586e0, 0x006058aa, 0x30dc7d62,
+			0x11e69ed7, 0x2338ea63, 0x53c2dd94, 0xc2c21634,
+			0xbbcbee56, 0x90bcb6de, 0xebfc7da1, 0xce591d76,
+			0x6f05e409, 0x4b7c0188, 0x39720a3d, 0x7c927c24,
+			0x86e3725f, 0x724d9db9, 0x1ac15bb4, 0xd39eb8fc,
+			0xed545578, 0x08fca5b5, 0xd83d7cd3, 0x4dad0fc4,
+			0x1e50ef5e, 0xb161e6f8, 0xa28514d9, 0x6c51133c,
+			0x6fd5c7e7, 0x56e14ec4, 0x362abfce, 0xddc6c837,
+			0xd79a3234, 0x92638212, 0x670efa8e, 0x406000e0
+		}, {
+			0x3a39ce37, 0xd3faf5cf, 0xabc27737, 0x5ac52d1b,
+			0x5cb0679e, 0x4fa33742, 0xd3822740, 0x99bc9bbe,
+			0xd5118e9d, 0xbf0f7315, 0xd62d1c7e, 0xc700c47b,
+			0xb78c1b6b, 0x21a19045, 0xb26eb1be, 0x6a366eb4,
+			0x5748ab2f, 0xbc946e79, 0xc6a376d2, 0x6549c2c8,
+			0x530ff8ee, 0x468dde7d, 0xd5730a1d, 0x4cd04dc6,
+			0x2939bbdb, 0xa9ba4650, 0xac9526e8, 0xbe5ee304,
+			0xa1fad5f0, 0x6a2d519a, 0x63ef8ce2, 0x9a86ee22,
+			0xc089c2b8, 0x43242ef6, 0xa51e03aa, 0x9cf2d0a4,
+			0x83c061ba, 0x9be96a4d, 0x8fe51550, 0xba645bd6,
+			0x2826a2f9, 0xa73a3ae1, 0x4ba99586, 0xef5562e9,
+			0xc72fefd3, 0xf752f7da, 0x3f046f69, 0x77fa0a59,
+			0x80e4a915, 0x87b08601, 0x9b09e6ad, 0x3b3ee593,
+			0xe990fd5a, 0x9e34d797, 0x2cf0b7d9, 0x022b8b51,
+			0x96d5ac3a, 0x017da67d, 0xd1cf3ed6, 0x7c7d2d28,
+			0x1f9f25cf, 0xadf2b89b, 0x5ad6b472, 0x5a88f54c,
+			0xe029ac71, 0xe019a5e6, 0x47b0acfd, 0xed93fa9b,
+			0xe8d3c48d, 0x283b57cc, 0xf8d56629, 0x79132e28,
+			0x785f0191, 0xed756055, 0xf7960e44, 0xe3d35e8c,
+			0x15056dd4, 0x88f46dba, 0x03a16125, 0x0564f0bd,
+			0xc3eb9e15, 0x3c9057a2, 0x97271aec, 0xa93a072a,
+			0x1b3f6d9b, 0x1e6321f5, 0xf59c66fb, 0x26dcf319,
+			0x7533d928, 0xb155fdf5, 0x03563482, 0x8aba3cbb,
+			0x28517711, 0xc20ad9f8, 0xabcc5167, 0xccad925f,
+			0x4de81751, 0x3830dc8e, 0x379d5862, 0x9320f991,
+			0xea7a90c2, 0xfb3e7bce, 0x5121ce64, 0x774fbe32,
+			0xa8b6e37e, 0xc3293d46, 0x48de5369, 0x6413e680,
+			0xa2ae0810, 0xdd6db224, 0x69852dfd, 0x09072166,
+			0xb39a460a, 0x6445c0dd, 0x586cdecf, 0x1c20c8ae,
+			0x5bbef7dd, 0x1b588d40, 0xccd2017f, 0x6bb4e3bb,
+			0xdda26a7e, 0x3a59ff45, 0x3e350a44, 0xbcb4cdd5,
+			0x72eacea8, 0xfa6484bb, 0x8d6612ae, 0xbf3c6f47,
+			0xd29be463, 0x542f5d9e, 0xaec2771b, 0xf64e6370,
+			0x740e0d8d, 0xe75b1357, 0xf8721671, 0xaf537d5d,
+			0x4040cb08, 0x4eb4e2cc, 0x34d2466a, 0x0115af84,
+			0xe1b00428, 0x95983a1d, 0x06b89fb4, 0xce6ea048,
+			0x6f3f3b82, 0x3520ab82, 0x011a1d4b, 0x277227f8,
+			0x611560b1, 0xe7933fdc, 0xbb3a792b, 0x344525bd,
+			0xa08839e1, 0x51ce794b, 0x2f32c9b7, 0xa01fbac9,
+			0xe01cc87e, 0xbcc7d1f6, 0xcf0111c3, 0xa1e8aac7,
+			0x1a908749, 0xd44fbd9a, 0xd0dadecb, 0xd50ada38,
+			0x0339c32a, 0xc6913667, 0x8df9317c, 0xe0b12b4f,
+			0xf79e59b7, 0x43f5bb3a, 0xf2d519ff, 0x27d9459c,
+			0xbf97222c, 0x15e6fc2a, 0x0f91fc71, 0x9b941525,
+			0xfae59361, 0xceb69ceb, 0xc2a86459, 0x12baa8d1,
+			0xb6c1075e, 0xe3056a0c, 0x10d25065, 0xcb03a442,
+			0xe0ec6e0e, 0x1698db3b, 0x4c98a0be, 0x3278e964,
+			0x9f1f9532, 0xe0d392df, 0xd3a0342b, 0x8971f21e,
+			0x1b0a7441, 0x4ba3348c, 0xc5be7120, 0xc37632d8,
+			0xdf359f8d, 0x9b992f2e, 0xe60b6f47, 0x0fe3f11d,
+			0xe54cda54, 0x1edad891, 0xce6279cf, 0xcd3e7e6f,
+			0x1618b166, 0xfd2c1d05, 0x848fd2c5, 0xf6fb2299,
+			0xf523f357, 0xa6327623, 0x93a83531, 0x56cccd02,
+			0xacf08162, 0x5a75ebb5, 0x6e163697, 0x88d273cc,
+			0xde966292, 0x81b949d0, 0x4c50901b, 0x71c65614,
+			0xe6c6c7bd, 0x327a140a, 0x45e1d006, 0xc3f27b9a,
+			0xc9aa53fd, 0x62a80f00, 0xbb25bfe2, 0x35bdd2f6,
+			0x71126905, 0xb2040222, 0xb6cbcf7c, 0xcd769c2b,
+			0x53113ec0, 0x1640e3d3, 0x38abbd60, 0x2547adf0,
+			0xba38209c, 0xf746ce76, 0x77afa1c5, 0x20756060,
+			0x85cbfe4e, 0x8ae88dd8, 0x7aaaf9b0, 0x4cf9aa7e,
+			0x1948c25c, 0x02fb8a8c, 0x01c36ae4, 0xd6ebe1f9,
+			0x90d4f869, 0xa65cdea0, 0x3f09252d, 0xc208e69f,
+			0xb74e6132, 0xce77e25b, 0x578fdfe3, 0x3ac372e6
+		}
+	}, {
+		0x243f6a88, 0x85a308d3, 0x13198a2e, 0x03707344,
+		0xa4093822, 0x299f31d0, 0x082efa98, 0xec4e6c89,
+		0x452821e6, 0x38d01377, 0xbe5466cf, 0x34e90c6c,
+		0xc0ac29b7, 0xc97c50dd, 0x3f84d5b5, 0xb5470917,
+		0x9216d5d9, 0x8979fb1b
+	}
+};
+
+static unsigned char BF_itoa64[64 + 1] =
+	"./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789";
+
+static unsigned char BF_atoi64[0x60] = {
+	64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 0, 1,
+	54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64,
+	64, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
+	17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64,
+	64, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42,
+	43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64
+};
+
+#define BF_safe_atoi64(dst, src) \
+{ \
+	tmp = (unsigned char)(src); \
+	if ((unsigned int)(tmp -= 0x20) >= 0x60) return -1; \
+	tmp = BF_atoi64[tmp]; \
+	if (tmp > 63) return -1; \
+	(dst) = tmp; \
+}
+
+static int BF_decode(BF_word *dst, const char *src, int size)
+{
+	unsigned char *dptr = (unsigned char *)dst;
+	unsigned char *end = dptr + size;
+	const unsigned char *sptr = (const unsigned char *)src;
+	unsigned int tmp, c1, c2, c3, c4;
+
+	do {
+		BF_safe_atoi64(c1, *sptr++);
+		BF_safe_atoi64(c2, *sptr++);
+		*dptr++ = (c1 << 2) | ((c2 & 0x30) >> 4);
+		if (dptr >= end) break;
+
+		BF_safe_atoi64(c3, *sptr++);
+		*dptr++ = ((c2 & 0x0F) << 4) | ((c3 & 0x3C) >> 2);
+		if (dptr >= end) break;
+
+		BF_safe_atoi64(c4, *sptr++);
+		*dptr++ = ((c3 & 0x03) << 6) | c4;
+	} while (dptr < end);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void BF_encode(char *dst, const BF_word *src, int size)
+{
+	const unsigned char *sptr = (const unsigned char *)src;
+	const unsigned char *end = sptr + size;
+	unsigned char *dptr = (unsigned char *)dst;
+	unsigned int c1, c2;
+
+	do {
+		c1 = *sptr++;
+		*dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1 >> 2];
+		c1 = (c1 & 0x03) << 4;
+		if (sptr >= end) {
+			*dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1];
+			break;
+		}
+
+		c2 = *sptr++;
+		c1 |= c2 >> 4;
+		*dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1];
+		c1 = (c2 & 0x0f) << 2;
+		if (sptr >= end) {
+			*dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1];
+			break;
+		}
+
+		c2 = *sptr++;
+		c1 |= c2 >> 6;
+		*dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1];
+		*dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c2 & 0x3f];
+	} while (sptr < end);
+}
+
+static void BF_swap(BF_word *x, int count)
+{
+	static int endianness_check = 1;
+	char *is_little_endian = (char *)&endianness_check;
+	BF_word tmp;
+
+	if (*is_little_endian)
+	do {
+		tmp = *x;
+		tmp = (tmp << 16) | (tmp >> 16);
+		*x++ = ((tmp & 0x00FF00FF) << 8) | ((tmp >> 8) & 0x00FF00FF);
+	} while (--count);
+}
+
+#if BF_SCALE
+/* Architectures which can shift addresses left by 2 bits with no extra cost */
+#define BF_ROUND(L, R, N) \
+	tmp1 = L & 0xFF; \
+	tmp2 = L >> 8; \
+	tmp2 &= 0xFF; \
+	tmp3 = L >> 16; \
+	tmp3 &= 0xFF; \
+	tmp4 = L >> 24; \
+	tmp1 = data.ctx.S[3][tmp1]; \
+	tmp2 = data.ctx.S[2][tmp2]; \
+	tmp3 = data.ctx.S[1][tmp3]; \
+	tmp3 += data.ctx.S[0][tmp4]; \
+	tmp3 ^= tmp2; \
+	R ^= data.ctx.P[N + 1]; \
+	tmp3 += tmp1; \
+	R ^= tmp3;
+#else
+/* Architectures with no complicated addressing modes supported */
+#define BF_INDEX(S, i) \
+	(*((BF_word *)(((unsigned char *)S) + (i))))
+#define BF_ROUND(L, R, N) \
+	tmp1 = L & 0xFF; \
+	tmp1 <<= 2; \
+	tmp2 = L >> 6; \
+	tmp2 &= 0x3FC; \
+	tmp3 = L >> 14; \
+	tmp3 &= 0x3FC; \
+	tmp4 = L >> 22; \
+	tmp4 &= 0x3FC; \
+	tmp1 = BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[3], tmp1); \
+	tmp2 = BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[2], tmp2); \
+	tmp3 = BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[1], tmp3); \
+	tmp3 += BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[0], tmp4); \
+	tmp3 ^= tmp2; \
+	R ^= data.ctx.P[N + 1]; \
+	tmp3 += tmp1; \
+	R ^= tmp3;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt one block, BF_N is hardcoded here.
+ */
+#define BF_ENCRYPT \
+	L ^= data.ctx.P[0]; \
+	BF_ROUND(L, R, 0); \
+	BF_ROUND(R, L, 1); \
+	BF_ROUND(L, R, 2); \
+	BF_ROUND(R, L, 3); \
+	BF_ROUND(L, R, 4); \
+	BF_ROUND(R, L, 5); \
+	BF_ROUND(L, R, 6); \
+	BF_ROUND(R, L, 7); \
+	BF_ROUND(L, R, 8); \
+	BF_ROUND(R, L, 9); \
+	BF_ROUND(L, R, 10); \
+	BF_ROUND(R, L, 11); \
+	BF_ROUND(L, R, 12); \
+	BF_ROUND(R, L, 13); \
+	BF_ROUND(L, R, 14); \
+	BF_ROUND(R, L, 15); \
+	tmp4 = R; \
+	R = L; \
+	L = tmp4 ^ data.ctx.P[BF_N + 1];
+
+#if BF_ASM
+#define BF_body() \
+	_BF_body_r(&data.ctx);
+#else
+#define BF_body() \
+	L = R = 0; \
+	ptr = data.ctx.P; \
+	do { \
+		ptr += 2; \
+		BF_ENCRYPT; \
+		*(ptr - 2) = L; \
+		*(ptr - 1) = R; \
+	} while (ptr < &data.ctx.P[BF_N + 2]); \
+\
+	ptr = data.ctx.S[0]; \
+	do { \
+		ptr += 2; \
+		BF_ENCRYPT; \
+		*(ptr - 2) = L; \
+		*(ptr - 1) = R; \
+	} while (ptr < &data.ctx.S[3][0xFF]);
+#endif
+
+static void BF_set_key(const char *key, BF_key expanded, BF_key initial,
+    unsigned char flags)
+{
+	const char *ptr = key;
+	unsigned int bug, i, j;
+	BF_word safety, sign, diff, tmp[2];
+
+/*
+ * There was a sign extension bug in older revisions of this function.  While
+ * we would have liked to simply fix the bug and move on, we have to provide
+ * a backwards compatibility feature (essentially the bug) for some systems and
+ * a safety measure for some others.  The latter is needed because for certain
+ * multiple inputs to the buggy algorithm there exist easily found inputs to
+ * the correct algorithm that produce the same hash.  Thus, we optionally
+ * deviate from the correct algorithm just enough to avoid such collisions.
+ * While the bug itself affected the majority of passwords containing
+ * characters with the 8th bit set (although only a percentage of those in a
+ * collision-producing way), the anti-collision safety measure affects
+ * only a subset of passwords containing the '\xff' character (not even all of
+ * those passwords, just some of them).  This character is not found in valid
+ * UTF-8 sequences and is rarely used in popular 8-bit character encodings.
+ * Thus, the safety measure is unlikely to cause much annoyance, and is a
+ * reasonable tradeoff to use when authenticating against existing hashes that
+ * are not reliably known to have been computed with the correct algorithm.
+ *
+ * We use an approach that tries to minimize side-channel leaks of password
+ * information - that is, we mostly use fixed-cost bitwise operations instead
+ * of branches or table lookups.  (One conditional branch based on password
+ * length remains.  It is not part of the bug aftermath, though, and is
+ * difficult and possibly unreasonable to avoid given the use of C strings by
+ * the caller, which results in similar timing leaks anyway.)
+ *
+ * For actual implementation, we set an array index in the variable "bug"
+ * (0 means no bug, 1 means sign extension bug emulation) and a flag in the
+ * variable "safety" (bit 16 is set when the safety measure is requested).
+ * Valid combinations of settings are:
+ *
+ * Prefix "$2a$": bug = 0, safety = 0x10000
+ * Prefix "$2b$": bug = 0, safety = 0
+ * Prefix "$2x$": bug = 1, safety = 0
+ * Prefix "$2y$": bug = 0, safety = 0
+ */
+	bug = (unsigned int)flags & 1;
+	safety = ((BF_word)flags & 2) << 15;
+
+	sign = diff = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i++) {
+		tmp[0] = tmp[1] = 0;
+		for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
+			tmp[0] <<= 8;
+			tmp[0] |= (unsigned char)*ptr; /* correct */
+			tmp[1] <<= 8;
+			tmp[1] |= (BF_word_signed)(signed char)*ptr; /* bug */
+/*
+ * Sign extension in the first char has no effect - nothing to overwrite yet,
+ * and those extra 24 bits will be fully shifted out of the 32-bit word.  For
+ * chars 2, 3, 4 in each four-char block, we set bit 7 of "sign" if sign
+ * extension in tmp[1] occurs.  Once this flag is set, it remains set.
+ */
+			if (j)
+				sign |= tmp[1] & 0x80;
+			if (!*ptr)
+				ptr = key;
+			else
+				ptr++;
+		}
+		diff |= tmp[0] ^ tmp[1]; /* Non-zero on any differences */
+
+		expanded[i] = tmp[bug];
+		initial[i] = BF_init_state.P[i] ^ tmp[bug];
+	}
+
+/*
+ * At this point, "diff" is zero iff the correct and buggy algorithms produced
+ * exactly the same result.  If so and if "sign" is non-zero, which indicates
+ * that there was a non-benign sign extension, this means that we have a
+ * collision between the correctly computed hash for this password and a set of
+ * passwords that could be supplied to the buggy algorithm.  Our safety measure
+ * is meant to protect from such many-buggy to one-correct collisions, by
+ * deviating from the correct algorithm in such cases.  Let's check for this.
+ */
+	diff |= diff >> 16; /* still zero iff exact match */
+	diff &= 0xffff; /* ditto */
+	diff += 0xffff; /* bit 16 set iff "diff" was non-zero (on non-match) */
+	sign <<= 9; /* move the non-benign sign extension flag to bit 16 */
+	sign &= ~diff & safety; /* action needed? */
+
+/*
+ * If we have determined that we need to deviate from the correct algorithm,
+ * flip bit 16 in initial expanded key.  (The choice of 16 is arbitrary, but
+ * let's stick to it now.  It came out of the approach we used above, and it's
+ * not any worse than any other choice we could make.)
+ *
+ * It is crucial that we don't do the same to the expanded key used in the main
+ * Eksblowfish loop.  By doing it to only one of these two, we deviate from a
+ * state that could be directly specified by a password to the buggy algorithm
+ * (and to the fully correct one as well, but that's a side-effect).
+ */
+	initial[0] ^= sign;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char flags_by_subtype[26] =
+	{2, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 4, 0};
+
+static char *BF_crypt(const char *key, const char *setting,
+	char *output, int size,
+	BF_word min)
+{
+#if BF_ASM
+	extern void _BF_body_r(BF_ctx *ctx);
+#endif
+	struct {
+		BF_ctx ctx;
+		BF_key expanded_key;
+		union {
+			BF_word salt[4];
+			BF_word output[6];
+		} binary;
+	} data;
+	BF_word L, R;
+	BF_word tmp1, tmp2, tmp3, tmp4;
+	BF_word *ptr;
+	BF_word count;
+	int i;
+
+	if (size < 7 + 22 + 31 + 1) {
+		__set_errno(ERANGE);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (setting[0] != '$' ||
+	    setting[1] != '2' ||
+	    setting[2] < 'a' || setting[2] > 'z' ||
+	    !flags_by_subtype[(unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a'] ||
+	    setting[3] != '$' ||
+	    setting[4] < '0' || setting[4] > '3' ||
+	    setting[5] < '0' || setting[5] > '9' ||
+	    (setting[4] == '3' && setting[5] > '1') ||
+	    setting[6] != '$') {
+		__set_errno(EINVAL);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	count = (BF_word)1 << ((setting[4] - '0') * 10 + (setting[5] - '0'));
+	if (count < min || BF_decode(data.binary.salt, &setting[7], 16)) {
+		__set_errno(EINVAL);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	BF_swap(data.binary.salt, 4);
+
+	BF_set_key(key, data.expanded_key, data.ctx.P,
+	    flags_by_subtype[(unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a']);
+
+	memcpy(data.ctx.S, BF_init_state.S, sizeof(data.ctx.S));
+
+	L = R = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i += 2) {
+		L ^= data.binary.salt[i & 2];
+		R ^= data.binary.salt[(i & 2) + 1];
+		BF_ENCRYPT;
+		data.ctx.P[i] = L;
+		data.ctx.P[i + 1] = R;
+	}
+
+	ptr = data.ctx.S[0];
+	do {
+		ptr += 4;
+		L ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 2) & 3];
+		R ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 3) & 3];
+		BF_ENCRYPT;
+		*(ptr - 4) = L;
+		*(ptr - 3) = R;
+
+		L ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 4) & 3];
+		R ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 5) & 3];
+		BF_ENCRYPT;
+		*(ptr - 2) = L;
+		*(ptr - 1) = R;
+	} while (ptr < &data.ctx.S[3][0xFF]);
+
+	do {
+		int done;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i += 2) {
+			data.ctx.P[i] ^= data.expanded_key[i];
+			data.ctx.P[i + 1] ^= data.expanded_key[i + 1];
+		}
+
+		done = 0;
+		do {
+			BF_body();
+			if (done)
+				break;
+			done = 1;
+
+			tmp1 = data.binary.salt[0];
+			tmp2 = data.binary.salt[1];
+			tmp3 = data.binary.salt[2];
+			tmp4 = data.binary.salt[3];
+			for (i = 0; i < BF_N; i += 4) {
+				data.ctx.P[i] ^= tmp1;
+				data.ctx.P[i + 1] ^= tmp2;
+				data.ctx.P[i + 2] ^= tmp3;
+				data.ctx.P[i + 3] ^= tmp4;
+			}
+			data.ctx.P[16] ^= tmp1;
+			data.ctx.P[17] ^= tmp2;
+		} while (1);
+	} while (--count);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 6; i += 2) {
+		L = BF_magic_w[i];
+		R = BF_magic_w[i + 1];
+
+		count = 64;
+		do {
+			BF_ENCRYPT;
+		} while (--count);
+
+		data.binary.output[i] = L;
+		data.binary.output[i + 1] = R;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(output, setting, 7 + 22 - 1);
+	output[7 + 22 - 1] = BF_itoa64[(int)
+		BF_atoi64[(int)setting[7 + 22 - 1] - 0x20] & 0x30];
+
+/* This has to be bug-compatible with the original implementation, so
+ * only encode 23 of the 24 bytes. :-) */
+	BF_swap(data.binary.output, 6);
+	BF_encode(&output[7 + 22], data.binary.output, 23);
+	output[7 + 22 + 31] = '\0';
+
+	return output;
+}
+
+int _crypt_output_magic(const char *setting, char *output, int size)
+{
+	if (size < 3)
+		return -1;
+
+	output[0] = '*';
+	output[1] = '0';
+	output[2] = '\0';
+
+	if (setting[0] == '*' && setting[1] == '0')
+		output[1] = '1';
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Please preserve the runtime self-test.  It serves two purposes at once:
+ *
+ * 1. We really can't afford the risk of producing incompatible hashes e.g.
+ * when there's something like gcc bug 26587 again, whereas an application or
+ * library integrating this code might not also integrate our external tests or
+ * it might not run them after every build.  Even if it does, the miscompile
+ * might only occur on the production build, but not on a testing build (such
+ * as because of different optimization settings).  It is painful to recover
+ * from incorrectly-computed hashes - merely fixing whatever broke is not
+ * enough.  Thus, a proactive measure like this self-test is needed.
+ *
+ * 2. We don't want to leave sensitive data from our actual password hash
+ * computation on the stack or in registers.  Previous revisions of the code
+ * would do explicit cleanups, but simply running the self-test after hash
+ * computation is more reliable.
+ *
+ * The performance cost of this quick self-test is around 0.6% at the "$2a$08"
+ * setting.
+ */
+char *_crypt_blowfish_rn(const char *key, const char *setting,
+	char *output, int size)
+{
+	const char *test_key = "8b \xd0\xc1\xd2\xcf\xcc\xd8";
+	const char *test_setting = "$2a$00$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuu";
+	static const char * const test_hashes[2] =
+		{"i1D709vfamulimlGcq0qq3UvuUasvEa\0\x55", /* 'a', 'b', 'y' */
+		"VUrPmXD6q/nVSSp7pNDhCR9071IfIRe\0\x55"}; /* 'x' */
+	const char *test_hash = test_hashes[0];
+	char *retval;
+	const char *p;
+	int save_errno, ok;
+	struct {
+		char s[7 + 22 + 1];
+		char o[7 + 22 + 31 + 1 + 1 + 1];
+	} buf;
+
+/* Hash the supplied password */
+	_crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size);
+	retval = BF_crypt(key, setting, output, size, 16);
+	save_errno = errno;
+
+/*
+ * Do a quick self-test.  It is important that we make both calls to BF_crypt()
+ * from the same scope such that they likely use the same stack locations,
+ * which makes the second call overwrite the first call's sensitive data on the
+ * stack and makes it more likely that any alignment related issues would be
+ * detected by the self-test.
+ */
+	memcpy(buf.s, test_setting, sizeof(buf.s));
+	if (retval) {
+		unsigned int flags = flags_by_subtype[
+		    (unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a'];
+		test_hash = test_hashes[flags & 1];
+		buf.s[2] = setting[2];
+	}
+	memset(buf.o, 0x55, sizeof(buf.o));
+	buf.o[sizeof(buf.o) - 1] = 0;
+	p = BF_crypt(test_key, buf.s, buf.o, sizeof(buf.o) - (1 + 1), 1);
+
+	ok = (p == buf.o &&
+	    !memcmp(p, buf.s, 7 + 22) &&
+	    !memcmp(p + (7 + 22), test_hash, 31 + 1 + 1 + 1));
+
+	{
+		const char *k = "\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345";
+		BF_key ae, ai, ye, yi;
+		BF_set_key(k, ae, ai, 2); /* $2a$ */
+		BF_set_key(k, ye, yi, 4); /* $2y$ */
+		ai[0] ^= 0x10000; /* undo the safety (for comparison) */
+		ok = ok && ai[0] == 0xdb9c59bc && ye[17] == 0x33343500 &&
+		    !memcmp(ae, ye, sizeof(ae)) &&
+		    !memcmp(ai, yi, sizeof(ai));
+	}
+
+	__set_errno(save_errno);
+	if (ok)
+		return retval;
+
+/* Should not happen */
+	_crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size);
+	__set_errno(EINVAL); /* pretend we don't support this hash type */
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+char *_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+	const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size)
+{
+	if (size < 16 || output_size < 7 + 22 + 1 ||
+	    (count && (count < 4 || count > 31)) ||
+	    prefix[0] != '$' || prefix[1] != '2' ||
+	    (prefix[2] != 'a' && prefix[2] != 'b' && prefix[2] != 'y')) {
+		if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0';
+		__set_errno((output_size < 7 + 22 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!count) count = 5;
+
+	output[0] = '$';
+	output[1] = '2';
+	output[2] = prefix[2];
+	output[3] = '$';
+	output[4] = '0' + count / 10;
+	output[5] = '0' + count % 10;
+	output[6] = '$';
+
+	BF_encode(&output[7], (const BF_word *)input, 16);
+	output[7 + 22] = '\0';
+
+	return output;
+}

libs/libbcrypt/crypt_blowfish/crypt_blowfish.h

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011.
+ * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
+ * domain.  In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
+ * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
+ * general public under the following terms:
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted.
+ *
+ * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
+ *
+ * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPT_BLOWFISH_H
+#define _CRYPT_BLOWFISH_H
+
+extern int _crypt_output_magic(const char *setting, char *output, int size);
+extern char *_crypt_blowfish_rn(const char *key, const char *setting,
+	char *output, int size);
+extern char *_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(const char *prefix,
+	unsigned long count,
+	const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
+
+#endif

libs/libbcrypt/crypt_blowfish/crypt_gensalt.c

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011.
+ * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
+ * domain.  In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
+ * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
+ * general public under the following terms:
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted.
+ *
+ * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
+ *
+ * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
+ *
+ * This file contains salt generation functions for the traditional and
+ * other common crypt(3) algorithms, except for bcrypt which is defined
+ * entirely in crypt_blowfish.c.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifndef __set_errno
+#define __set_errno(val) errno = (val)
+#endif
+
+/* Just to make sure the prototypes match the actual definitions */
+#include "crypt_gensalt.h"
+
+unsigned char _crypt_itoa64[64 + 1] =
+	"./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
+
+char *_crypt_gensalt_traditional_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+	const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size)
+{
+	(void) prefix;
+
+	if (size < 2 || output_size < 2 + 1 || (count && count != 25)) {
+		if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0';
+		__set_errno((output_size < 2 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	output[0] = _crypt_itoa64[(unsigned int)input[0] & 0x3f];
+	output[1] = _crypt_itoa64[(unsigned int)input[1] & 0x3f];
+	output[2] = '\0';
+
+	return output;
+}
+
+char *_crypt_gensalt_extended_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+	const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size)
+{
+	unsigned long value;
+
+	(void) prefix;
+
+/* Even iteration counts make it easier to detect weak DES keys from a look
+ * at the hash, so they should be avoided */
+	if (size < 3 || output_size < 1 + 4 + 4 + 1 ||
+	    (count && (count > 0xffffff || !(count & 1)))) {
+		if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0';
+		__set_errno((output_size < 1 + 4 + 4 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!count) count = 725;
+
+	output[0] = '_';
+	output[1] = _crypt_itoa64[count & 0x3f];
+	output[2] = _crypt_itoa64[(count >> 6) & 0x3f];
+	output[3] = _crypt_itoa64[(count >> 12) & 0x3f];
+	output[4] = _crypt_itoa64[(count >> 18) & 0x3f];
+	value = (unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[0] |
+		((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[1] << 8) |
+		((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[2] << 16);
+	output[5] = _crypt_itoa64[value & 0x3f];
+	output[6] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 6) & 0x3f];
+	output[7] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 12) & 0x3f];
+	output[8] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 18) & 0x3f];
+	output[9] = '\0';
+
+	return output;
+}
+
+char *_crypt_gensalt_md5_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+	const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size)
+{
+	unsigned long value;
+
+	(void) prefix;
+
+	if (size < 3 || output_size < 3 + 4 + 1 || (count && count != 1000)) {
+		if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0';
+		__set_errno((output_size < 3 + 4 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	output[0] = '$';
+	output[1] = '1';
+	output[2] = '$';
+	value = (unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[0] |
+		((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[1] << 8) |
+		((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[2] << 16);
+	output[3] = _crypt_itoa64[value & 0x3f];
+	output[4] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 6) & 0x3f];
+	output[5] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 12) & 0x3f];
+	output[6] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 18) & 0x3f];
+	output[7] = '\0';
+
+	if (size >= 6 && output_size >= 3 + 4 + 4 + 1) {
+		value = (unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[3] |
+			((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[4] << 8) |
+			((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[5] << 16);
+		output[7] = _crypt_itoa64[value & 0x3f];
+		output[8] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 6) & 0x3f];
+		output[9] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 12) & 0x3f];
+		output[10] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 18) & 0x3f];
+		output[11] = '\0';
+	}
+
+	return output;
+}

libs/libbcrypt/crypt_blowfish/crypt_gensalt.h

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011.
+ * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
+ * domain.  In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
+ * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
+ * general public under the following terms:
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted.
+ *
+ * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
+ *
+ * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPT_GENSALT_H
+#define _CRYPT_GENSALT_H
+
+extern unsigned char _crypt_itoa64[];
+extern char *_crypt_gensalt_traditional_rn(const char *prefix,
+	unsigned long count,
+	const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
+extern char *_crypt_gensalt_extended_rn(const char *prefix,
+	unsigned long count,
+	const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
+extern char *_crypt_gensalt_md5_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+	const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
+
+#endif

libs/libbcrypt/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.1.3-crypt.diff

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+--- glibc-2.1.3.orig/crypt/sysdeps/unix/Makefile	1997-03-05 00:33:59 +0000
++++ glibc-2.1.3/crypt/sysdeps/unix/Makefile	2000-06-11 03:13:41 +0000
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+ ifeq ($(subdir),md5-crypt)
+-libcrypt-routines += crypt crypt_util
+-dont_distribute += crypt.c crypt_util.c
++libcrypt-routines += crypt crypt_util crypt_blowfish x86 crypt_gensalt wrapper
++dont_distribute += crypt.c crypt_util.c crypt_blowfish.c x86.S crypt_gensalt.c wrapper.c
+ endif
+--- glibc-2.1.3.orig/crypt/sysdeps/unix/crypt-entry.c	1998-12-10 12:49:04 +0000
++++ glibc-2.1.3/crypt/sysdeps/unix/crypt-entry.c	2000-06-11 03:14:57 +0000
+@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ extern struct crypt_data _ufc_foobar;
+  */
+ 
+ char *
+-__crypt_r (key, salt, data)
++__des_crypt_r (key, salt, data)
+      const char *key;
+      const char *salt;
+      struct crypt_data * __restrict data;
+@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ __crypt_r (key, salt, data)
+   _ufc_output_conversion_r (res[0], res[1], salt, data);
+   return data->crypt_3_buf;
+ }
++#if 0
+ weak_alias (__crypt_r, crypt_r)
+ 
+ char *
+@@ -147,3 +148,4 @@ __fcrypt (key, salt)
+   return crypt (key, salt);
+ }
+ #endif
++#endif
+--- glibc-2.1.3.orig/md5-crypt/Makefile	1998-07-02 22:46:47 +0000
++++ glibc-2.1.3/md5-crypt/Makefile	2000-06-11 03:12:34 +0000
+@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
+ #
+ subdir	:= md5-crypt
+ 
+-headers := crypt.h
++headers := crypt.h gnu-crypt.h ow-crypt.h
+ 
+ distribute := md5.h
+ 
+--- glibc-2.1.3.orig/md5-crypt/Versions	1998-07-02 22:32:07 +0000
++++ glibc-2.1.3/md5-crypt/Versions	2000-06-11 09:11:03 +0000
+@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
+ libcrypt {
+   GLIBC_2.0 {
+     crypt; crypt_r; encrypt; encrypt_r; fcrypt; setkey; setkey_r;
++    crypt_rn; crypt_ra; crypt_gensalt; crypt_gensalt_rn; crypt_gensalt_ra;
+   }
+ }

libs/libbcrypt/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.14-crypt.diff

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+diff -urp glibc-2.14.orig/crypt/Makefile glibc-2.14/crypt/Makefile
+--- glibc-2.14.orig/crypt/Makefile	2011-05-31 04:12:33 +0000
++++ glibc-2.14/crypt/Makefile	2011-07-16 21:40:56 +0000
+@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
+ subdir	:= crypt
+ 
+ headers := crypt.h
++headers += gnu-crypt.h ow-crypt.h
+ 
+ extra-libs := libcrypt
+ extra-libs-others := $(extra-libs)
+@@ -29,6 +30,8 @@ extra-libs-others := $(extra-libs)
+ libcrypt-routines := crypt-entry md5-crypt sha256-crypt sha512-crypt crypt \
+ 		     crypt_util
+ 
++libcrypt-routines += crypt_blowfish x86 crypt_gensalt wrapper
++
+ tests := cert md5c-test sha256c-test sha512c-test
+ 
+ distribute := ufc-crypt.h crypt-private.h ufc.c speeds.c README.ufc-crypt \
+diff -urp glibc-2.14.orig/crypt/Versions glibc-2.14/crypt/Versions
+--- glibc-2.14.orig/crypt/Versions	2011-05-31 04:12:33 +0000
++++ glibc-2.14/crypt/Versions	2011-07-16 21:40:56 +0000
+@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
+ libcrypt {
+   GLIBC_2.0 {
+     crypt; crypt_r; encrypt; encrypt_r; fcrypt; setkey; setkey_r;
++    crypt_rn; crypt_ra; crypt_gensalt; crypt_gensalt_rn; crypt_gensalt_ra;
+   }
+ }
+diff -urp glibc-2.14.orig/crypt/crypt-entry.c glibc-2.14/crypt/crypt-entry.c
+--- glibc-2.14.orig/crypt/crypt-entry.c	2011-05-31 04:12:33 +0000
++++ glibc-2.14/crypt/crypt-entry.c	2011-07-16 21:40:56 +0000
+@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ extern struct crypt_data _ufc_foobar;
+  */
+ 
+ char *
+-__crypt_r (key, salt, data)
++__des_crypt_r (key, salt, data)
+      const char *key;
+      const char *salt;
+      struct crypt_data * __restrict data;
+@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ __crypt_r (key, salt, data)
+   _ufc_output_conversion_r (res[0], res[1], salt, data);
+   return data->crypt_3_buf;
+ }
++#if 0
+ weak_alias (__crypt_r, crypt_r)
+ 
+ char *
+@@ -177,3 +178,4 @@ __fcrypt (key, salt)
+   return crypt (key, salt);
+ }
+ #endif
++#endif

libs/libbcrypt/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.3.6-crypt.diff

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+--- glibc-2.3.6.orig/crypt/Makefile	2001-07-06 04:54:45 +0000
++++ glibc-2.3.6/crypt/Makefile	2004-02-27 00:23:48 +0000
+@@ -21,14 +21,14 @@
+ #
+ subdir	:= crypt
+ 
+-headers := crypt.h
++headers := crypt.h gnu-crypt.h ow-crypt.h
+ 
+ distribute := md5.h
+ 
+ extra-libs := libcrypt
+ extra-libs-others := $(extra-libs)
+ 
+-libcrypt-routines := crypt-entry md5-crypt md5 crypt crypt_util
++libcrypt-routines := crypt-entry md5-crypt md5 crypt crypt_util crypt_blowfish x86 crypt_gensalt wrapper
+ 
+ tests = cert md5test md5c-test
+ 
+--- glibc-2.3.6.orig/crypt/Versions	2000-03-04 00:47:30 +0000
++++ glibc-2.3.6/crypt/Versions	2004-02-27 00:25:15 +0000
+@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
+ libcrypt {
+   GLIBC_2.0 {
+     crypt; crypt_r; encrypt; encrypt_r; fcrypt; setkey; setkey_r;
++    crypt_rn; crypt_ra; crypt_gensalt; crypt_gensalt_rn; crypt_gensalt_ra;
+   }
+ }
+--- glibc-2.3.6.orig/crypt/crypt-entry.c	2001-07-06 05:18:49 +0000
++++ glibc-2.3.6/crypt/crypt-entry.c	2004-02-27 00:12:32 +0000
+@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ extern struct crypt_data _ufc_foobar;
+  */
+ 
+ char *
+-__crypt_r (key, salt, data)
++__des_crypt_r (key, salt, data)
+      const char *key;
+      const char *salt;
+      struct crypt_data * __restrict data;
+@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ __crypt_r (key, salt, data)
+   _ufc_output_conversion_r (res[0], res[1], salt, data);
+   return data->crypt_3_buf;
+ }
++#if 0
+ weak_alias (__crypt_r, crypt_r)
+ 
+ char *
+@@ -147,3 +148,4 @@ __fcrypt (key, salt)
+   return crypt (key, salt);
+ }
+ #endif
++#endif

libs/libbcrypt/crypt_blowfish/ow-crypt.h

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011.
+ * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
+ * domain.  In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
+ * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
+ * general public under the following terms:
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted.
+ *
+ * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
+ *
+ * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _OW_CRYPT_H
+#define _OW_CRYPT_H
+
+#ifndef __GNUC__
+#undef __const
+#define __const const
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __SKIP_GNU
+extern char *crypt(__const char *key, __const char *setting);
+extern char *crypt_r(__const char *key, __const char *setting, void *data);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __SKIP_OW
+extern char *crypt_rn(__const char *key, __const char *setting,
+	void *data, int size);
+extern char *crypt_ra(__const char *key, __const char *setting,
+	void **data, int *size);
+extern char *crypt_gensalt(__const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+	__const char *input, int size);
+extern char *crypt_gensalt_rn(__const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+	__const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
+extern char *crypt_gensalt_ra(__const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+	__const char *input, int size);
+#endif
+
+#endif

libs/libbcrypt/crypt_blowfish/wrapper.c

@@ -0,0 +1,551 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2014.
+ * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
+ * domain.  In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
+ * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2014 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
+ * general public under the following terms:
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted.
+ *
+ * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
+ *
+ * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifndef __set_errno
+#define __set_errno(val) errno = (val)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef TEST
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/times.h>
+#ifdef TEST_THREADS
+#include <pthread.h>
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#define CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE		(7 + 22 + 31 + 1)
+#define CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE	(7 + 22 + 1)
+
+#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC)
+#define __SKIP_GNU
+#endif
+#include "ow-crypt.h"
+
+#include "crypt_blowfish.h"
+#include "crypt_gensalt.h"
+
+#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC)
+/* crypt.h from glibc-crypt-2.1 will define struct crypt_data for us */
+#include "crypt.h"
+extern char *__md5_crypt_r(const char *key, const char *salt,
+	char *buffer, int buflen);
+/* crypt-entry.c needs to be patched to define __des_crypt_r rather than
+ * __crypt_r, and not define crypt_r and crypt at all */
+extern char *__des_crypt_r(const char *key, const char *salt,
+	struct crypt_data *data);
+extern struct crypt_data _ufc_foobar;
+#endif
+
+static int _crypt_data_alloc(void **data, int *size, int need)
+{
+	void *updated;
+
+	if (*data && *size >= need) return 0;
+
+	updated = realloc(*data, need);
+
+	if (!updated) {
+#ifndef __GLIBC__
+		/* realloc(3) on glibc sets errno, so we don't need to bother */
+		__set_errno(ENOMEM);
+#endif
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC)
+	if (need >= sizeof(struct crypt_data))
+		((struct crypt_data *)updated)->initialized = 0;
+#endif
+
+	*data = updated;
+	*size = need;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static char *_crypt_retval_magic(char *retval, const char *setting,
+	char *output, int size)
+{
+	if (retval)
+		return retval;
+
+	if (_crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size))
+		return NULL; /* shouldn't happen */
+
+	return output;
+}
+
+#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC)
+/*
+ * Applications may re-use the same instance of struct crypt_data without
+ * resetting the initialized field in order to let crypt_r() skip some of
+ * its initialization code.  Thus, it is important that our multiple hashing
+ * algorithms either don't conflict with each other in their use of the
+ * data area or reset the initialized field themselves whenever required.
+ * Currently, the hashing algorithms simply have no conflicts: the first
+ * field of struct crypt_data is the 128-byte large DES key schedule which
+ * __des_crypt_r() calculates each time it is called while the two other
+ * hashing algorithms use less than 128 bytes of the data area.
+ */
+
+char *__crypt_rn(__const char *key, __const char *setting,
+	void *data, int size)
+{
+	if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '2')
+		return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)data, size);
+	if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '1')
+		return __md5_crypt_r(key, setting, (char *)data, size);
+	if (setting[0] == '$' || setting[0] == '_') {
+		__set_errno(EINVAL);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (size >= sizeof(struct crypt_data))
+		return __des_crypt_r(key, setting, (struct crypt_data *)data);
+	__set_errno(ERANGE);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+char *__crypt_ra(__const char *key, __const char *setting,
+	void **data, int *size)
+{
+	if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '2') {
+		if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE))
+			return NULL;
+		return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)*data, *size);
+	}
+	if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '1') {
+		if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE))
+			return NULL;
+		return __md5_crypt_r(key, setting, (char *)*data, *size);
+	}
+	if (setting[0] == '$' || setting[0] == '_') {
+		__set_errno(EINVAL);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, sizeof(struct crypt_data)))
+		return NULL;
+	return __des_crypt_r(key, setting, (struct crypt_data *)*data);
+}
+
+char *__crypt_r(__const char *key, __const char *setting,
+	struct crypt_data *data)
+{
+	return _crypt_retval_magic(
+		__crypt_rn(key, setting, data, sizeof(*data)),
+		setting, (char *)data, sizeof(*data));
+}
+
+char *__crypt(__const char *key, __const char *setting)
+{
+	return _crypt_retval_magic(
+		__crypt_rn(key, setting, &_ufc_foobar, sizeof(_ufc_foobar)),
+		setting, (char *)&_ufc_foobar, sizeof(_ufc_foobar));
+}
+#else
+char *crypt_rn(const char *key, const char *setting, void *data, int size)
+{
+	return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)data, size);
+}
+
+char *crypt_ra(const char *key, const char *setting,
+	void **data, int *size)
+{
+	if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE))
+		return NULL;
+	return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)*data, *size);
+}
+
+char *crypt_r(const char *key, const char *setting, void *data)
+{
+	return _crypt_retval_magic(
+		crypt_rn(key, setting, data, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE),
+		setting, (char *)data, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE);
+}
+
+char *crypt(const char *key, const char *setting)
+{
+	static char output[CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE];
+
+	return _crypt_retval_magic(
+		crypt_rn(key, setting, output, sizeof(output)),
+		setting, output, sizeof(output));
+}
+
+#define __crypt_gensalt_rn crypt_gensalt_rn
+#define __crypt_gensalt_ra crypt_gensalt_ra
+#define __crypt_gensalt crypt_gensalt
+#endif
+
+char *__crypt_gensalt_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+	const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size)
+{
+	char *(*use)(const char *_prefix, unsigned long _count,
+		const char *_input, int _size,
+		char *_output, int _output_size);
+
+	/* This may be supported on some platforms in the future */
+	if (!input) {
+		__set_errno(EINVAL);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!strncmp(prefix, "$2a$", 4) || !strncmp(prefix, "$2b$", 4) ||
+	    !strncmp(prefix, "$2y$", 4))
+		use = _crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn;
+	else
+	if (!strncmp(prefix, "$1$", 3))
+		use = _crypt_gensalt_md5_rn;
+	else
+	if (prefix[0] == '_')
+		use = _crypt_gensalt_extended_rn;
+	else
+	if (!prefix[0] ||
+	    (prefix[0] && prefix[1] &&
+	    memchr(_crypt_itoa64, prefix[0], 64) &&
+	    memchr(_crypt_itoa64, prefix[1], 64)))
+		use = _crypt_gensalt_traditional_rn;
+	else {
+		__set_errno(EINVAL);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return use(prefix, count, input, size, output, output_size);
+}
+
+char *__crypt_gensalt_ra(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+	const char *input, int size)
+{
+	char output[CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE];
+	char *retval;
+
+	retval = __crypt_gensalt_rn(prefix, count,
+		input, size, output, sizeof(output));
+
+	if (retval) {
+		retval = strdup(retval);
+#ifndef __GLIBC__
+		/* strdup(3) on glibc sets errno, so we don't need to bother */
+		if (!retval)
+			__set_errno(ENOMEM);
+#endif
+	}
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+char *__crypt_gensalt(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
+	const char *input, int size)
+{
+	static char output[CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE];
+
+	return __crypt_gensalt_rn(prefix, count,
+		input, size, output, sizeof(output));
+}
+
+#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC)
+weak_alias(__crypt_rn, crypt_rn)
+weak_alias(__crypt_ra, crypt_ra)
+weak_alias(__crypt_r, crypt_r)
+weak_alias(__crypt, crypt)
+weak_alias(__crypt_gensalt_rn, crypt_gensalt_rn)
+weak_alias(__crypt_gensalt_ra, crypt_gensalt_ra)
+weak_alias(__crypt_gensalt, crypt_gensalt)
+weak_alias(crypt, fcrypt)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef TEST
+static const char *tests[][3] = {
+	{"$2a$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC.E5YPO9kmyuRGyh0XouQYb4YMJKvyOeW",
+		"U*U"},
+	{"$2a$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC.VGOzA784oUp/Z0DY336zx7pLYAy0lwK",
+		"U*U*"},
+	{"$2a$05$XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXOAcXxm9kjPGEMsLznoKqmqw7tc8WCx4a",
+		"U*U*U"},
+	{"$2a$05$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuu5s2v8.iXieOjg/.AySBTTZIIVFJeBui",
+		"0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
+		"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
+		"chars after 72 are ignored"},
+	{"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e",
+		"\xa3"},
+	{"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e",
+		"\xff\xff\xa3"},
+	{"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e",
+		"\xff\xff\xa3"},
+	{"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.nqd1wy.pTMdcvrRWxyiGL2eMz.2a85.",
+		"\xff\xff\xa3"},
+	{"$2b$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e",
+		"\xff\xff\xa3"},
+	{"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.Sa7shbm4.OzKpvFnX1pQLmQW96oUlCq",
+		"\xa3"},
+	{"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.Sa7shbm4.OzKpvFnX1pQLmQW96oUlCq",
+		"\xa3"},
+	{"$2b$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.Sa7shbm4.OzKpvFnX1pQLmQW96oUlCq",
+		"\xa3"},
+	{"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi",
+		"1\xa3" "345"},
+	{"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi",
+		"\xff\xa3" "345"},
+	{"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi",
+		"\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"},
+	{"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi",
+		"\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"},
+	{"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.ZC1JEJ8Z4gPfpe1JOr/oyPXTWl9EFd.",
+		"\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"},
+	{"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.nRht2l/HRhr6zmCp9vYUvvsqynflf9e",
+		"\xff\xa3" "345"},
+	{"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.nRht2l/HRhr6zmCp9vYUvvsqynflf9e",
+		"\xff\xa3" "345"},
+	{"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.6IflQkJytoRVc1yuaNtHfiuq.FRlSIS",
+		"\xa3" "ab"},
+	{"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.6IflQkJytoRVc1yuaNtHfiuq.FRlSIS",
+		"\xa3" "ab"},
+	{"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.6IflQkJytoRVc1yuaNtHfiuq.FRlSIS",
+		"\xa3" "ab"},
+	{"$2x$05$6bNw2HLQYeqHYyBfLMsv/OiwqTymGIGzFsA4hOTWebfehXHNprcAS",
+		"\xd1\x91"},
+	{"$2x$05$6bNw2HLQYeqHYyBfLMsv/O9LIGgn8OMzuDoHfof8AQimSGfcSWxnS",
+		"\xd0\xc1\xd2\xcf\xcc\xd8"},
+	{"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.swQOIzjOiJ9GHEPuhEkvqrUyvWhEMx6",
+		"\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa"
+		"\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa"
+		"\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa"
+		"\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa"
+		"\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa"
+		"\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa"
+		"chars after 72 are ignored as usual"},
+	{"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.R9xrDjiycxMbQE2bp.vgqlYpW5wx2yy",
+		"\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"
+		"\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"
+		"\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"
+		"\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"
+		"\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"
+		"\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"},
+	{"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.9tQZzcJfm3uj2NvJ/n5xkhpqLrMpWCe",
+		"\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"
+		"\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"
+		"\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"
+		"\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"
+		"\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"
+		"\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"},
+	{"$2a$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC.7uG0VCzI2bS7j6ymqJi9CdcdxiRTWNy",
+		""},
+	{"*0", "", "$2a$03$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."},
+	{"*0", "", "$2a$32$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."},
+	{"*0", "", "$2c$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."},
+	{"*0", "", "$2z$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."},
+	{"*0", "", "$2`$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."},
+	{"*0", "", "$2{$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."},
+	{"*1", "", "*0"},
+	{NULL}
+};
+
+#define which				tests[0]
+
+static volatile sig_atomic_t running;
+
+static void handle_timer(int signum)
+{
+	(void) signum;
+	running = 0;
+}
+
+static void *run(void *arg)
+{
+	unsigned long count = 0;
+	int i = 0;
+	void *data = NULL;
+	int size = 0x12345678;
+
+	do {
+		const char *hash = tests[i][0];
+		const char *key = tests[i][1];
+		const char *setting = tests[i][2];
+
+		if (!tests[++i][0])
+			i = 0;
+
+		if (setting && strlen(hash) < 30) /* not for benchmark */
+			continue;
+
+		if (strcmp(crypt_ra(key, hash, &data, &size), hash)) {
+			printf("%d: FAILED (crypt_ra/%d/%lu)\n",
+				(int)((char *)arg - (char *)0), i, count);
+			free(data);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		count++;
+	} while (running);
+
+	free(data);
+	return count + (char *)0;
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+	struct itimerval it;
+	struct tms buf;
+	clock_t clk_tck, start_real, start_virtual, end_real, end_virtual;
+	unsigned long count;
+	void *data;
+	int size;
+	char *setting1, *setting2;
+	int i;
+#ifdef TEST_THREADS
+	pthread_t t[TEST_THREADS];
+	void *t_retval;
+#endif
+
+	data = NULL;
+	size = 0x12345678;
+
+	for (i = 0; tests[i][0]; i++) {
+		const char *hash = tests[i][0];
+		const char *key = tests[i][1];
+		const char *setting = tests[i][2];
+		const char *p;
+		int ok = !setting || strlen(hash) >= 30;
+		int o_size;
+		char s_buf[30], o_buf[61];
+		if (!setting) {
+			memcpy(s_buf, hash, sizeof(s_buf) - 1);
+			s_buf[sizeof(s_buf) - 1] = 0;
+			setting = s_buf;
+		}
+
+		__set_errno(0);
+		p = crypt(key, setting);
+		if ((!ok && !errno) || strcmp(p, hash)) {
+			printf("FAILED (crypt/%d)\n", i);
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		if (ok && strcmp(crypt(key, hash), hash)) {
+			printf("FAILED (crypt/%d)\n", i);
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		for (o_size = -1; o_size <= (int)sizeof(o_buf); o_size++) {
+			int ok_n = ok && o_size == (int)sizeof(o_buf);
+			const char *x = "abc";
+			strcpy(o_buf, x);
+			if (o_size >= 3) {
+				x = "*0";
+				if (setting[0] == '*' && setting[1] == '0')
+					x = "*1";
+			}
+			__set_errno(0);
+			p = crypt_rn(key, setting, o_buf, o_size);
+			if ((ok_n && (!p || strcmp(p, hash))) ||
+			    (!ok_n && (!errno || p || strcmp(o_buf, x)))) {
+				printf("FAILED (crypt_rn/%d)\n", i);
+				return 1;
+			}
+		}
+
+		__set_errno(0);
+		p = crypt_ra(key, setting, &data, &size);
+		if ((ok && (!p || strcmp(p, hash))) ||
+		    (!ok && (!errno || p || strcmp((char *)data, hash)))) {
+			printf("FAILED (crypt_ra/%d)\n", i);
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	setting1 = crypt_gensalt(which[0], 12, data, size);
+	if (!setting1 || strncmp(setting1, "$2a$12$", 7)) {
+		puts("FAILED (crypt_gensalt)\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	setting2 = crypt_gensalt_ra(setting1, 12, data, size);
+	if (strcmp(setting1, setting2)) {
+		puts("FAILED (crypt_gensalt_ra/1)\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	(*(char *)data)++;
+	setting1 = crypt_gensalt_ra(setting2, 12, data, size);
+	if (!strcmp(setting1, setting2)) {
+		puts("FAILED (crypt_gensalt_ra/2)\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	free(setting1);
+	free(setting2);
+	free(data);
+
+#if defined(_SC_CLK_TCK) || !defined(CLK_TCK)
+	clk_tck = sysconf(_SC_CLK_TCK);
+#else
+	clk_tck = CLK_TCK;
+#endif
+
+	running = 1;
+	signal(SIGALRM, handle_timer);
+
+	memset(&it, 0, sizeof(it));
+	it.it_value.tv_sec = 5;
+	setitimer(ITIMER_REAL, &it, NULL);
+
+	start_real = times(&buf);
+	start_virtual = buf.tms_utime + buf.tms_stime;
+
+	count = (char *)run((char *)0) - (char *)0;
+
+	end_real = times(&buf);
+	end_virtual = buf.tms_utime + buf.tms_stime;
+	if (end_virtual == start_virtual) end_virtual++;
+
+	printf("%.1f c/s real, %.1f c/s virtual\n",
+		(float)count * clk_tck / (end_real - start_real),
+		(float)count * clk_tck / (end_virtual - start_virtual));
+
+#ifdef TEST_THREADS
+	running = 1;
+	it.it_value.tv_sec = 60;
+	setitimer(ITIMER_REAL, &it, NULL);
+	start_real = times(&buf);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < TEST_THREADS; i++)
+	if (pthread_create(&t[i], NULL, run, i + (char *)0)) {
+		perror("pthread_create");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < TEST_THREADS; i++) {
+		if (pthread_join(t[i], &t_retval)) {
+			perror("pthread_join");
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (!t_retval) continue;
+		count = (char *)t_retval - (char *)0;
+		end_real = times(&buf);
+		printf("%d: %.1f c/s real\n", i,
+			(float)count * clk_tck / (end_real - start_real));
+	}
+#endif
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif

libs/libbcrypt/crypt_blowfish/x86.S

@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 1998-2010.
+ * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
+ * domain.  In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
+ * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2010 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
+ * general public under the following terms:
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted.
+ *
+ * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
+ *
+ * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
+ */
+
+#ifdef __i386__
+
+#if defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__ELF__)
+#define UNDERSCORES
+#define ALIGN_LOG
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__CYGWIN32__) || defined(__MINGW32__)
+#define UNDERSCORES
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __DJGPP__
+#define UNDERSCORES
+#define ALIGN_LOG
+#endif
+
+#ifdef UNDERSCORES
+#define _BF_body_r			__BF_body_r
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ALIGN_LOG
+#define DO_ALIGN(log)			.align (log)
+#elif defined(DUMBAS)
+#define DO_ALIGN(log)			.align 1 << log
+#else
+#define DO_ALIGN(log)			.align (1 << (log))
+#endif
+
+#define BF_FRAME			0x200
+#define ctx				%esp
+
+#define BF_ptr				(ctx)
+
+#define S(N, r)				N+BF_FRAME(ctx,r,4)
+#ifdef DUMBAS
+#define P(N)				0x1000+N+N+N+N+BF_FRAME(ctx)
+#else
+#define P(N)				0x1000+4*N+BF_FRAME(ctx)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * This version of the assembly code is optimized primarily for the original
+ * Intel Pentium but is also careful to avoid partial register stalls on the
+ * Pentium Pro family of processors (tested up to Pentium III Coppermine).
+ *
+ * It is possible to do 15% faster on the Pentium Pro family and probably on
+ * many non-Intel x86 processors, but, unfortunately, that would make things
+ * twice slower for the original Pentium.
+ *
+ * An additional 2% speedup may be achieved with non-reentrant code.
+ */
+
+#define L				%esi
+#define R				%edi
+#define tmp1				%eax
+#define tmp1_lo				%al
+#define tmp2				%ecx
+#define tmp2_hi				%ch
+#define tmp3				%edx
+#define tmp3_lo				%dl
+#define tmp4				%ebx
+#define tmp4_hi				%bh
+#define tmp5				%ebp
+
+.text
+
+#define BF_ROUND(L, R, N) \
+	xorl L,tmp2; \
+	xorl tmp1,tmp1; \
+	movl tmp2,L; \
+	shrl $16,tmp2; \
+	movl L,tmp4; \
+	movb tmp2_hi,tmp1_lo; \
+	andl $0xFF,tmp2; \
+	movb tmp4_hi,tmp3_lo; \
+	andl $0xFF,tmp4; \
+	movl S(0,tmp1),tmp1; \
+	movl S(0x400,tmp2),tmp5; \
+	addl tmp5,tmp1; \
+	movl S(0x800,tmp3),tmp5; \
+	xorl tmp5,tmp1; \
+	movl S(0xC00,tmp4),tmp5; \
+	addl tmp1,tmp5; \
+	movl 4+P(N),tmp2; \
+	xorl tmp5,R
+
+#define BF_ENCRYPT_START \
+	BF_ROUND(L, R, 0); \
+	BF_ROUND(R, L, 1); \
+	BF_ROUND(L, R, 2); \
+	BF_ROUND(R, L, 3); \
+	BF_ROUND(L, R, 4); \
+	BF_ROUND(R, L, 5); \
+	BF_ROUND(L, R, 6); \
+	BF_ROUND(R, L, 7); \
+	BF_ROUND(L, R, 8); \
+	BF_ROUND(R, L, 9); \
+	BF_ROUND(L, R, 10); \
+	BF_ROUND(R, L, 11); \
+	BF_ROUND(L, R, 12); \
+	BF_ROUND(R, L, 13); \
+	BF_ROUND(L, R, 14); \
+	BF_ROUND(R, L, 15); \
+	movl BF_ptr,tmp5; \
+	xorl L,tmp2; \
+	movl P(17),L
+
+#define BF_ENCRYPT_END \
+	xorl R,L; \
+	movl tmp2,R
+
+DO_ALIGN(5)
+.globl _BF_body_r
+_BF_body_r:
+	movl 4(%esp),%eax
+	pushl %ebp
+	pushl %ebx
+	pushl %esi
+	pushl %edi
+	subl $BF_FRAME-8,%eax
+	xorl L,L
+	cmpl %esp,%eax
+	ja BF_die
+	xchgl %eax,%esp
+	xorl R,R
+	pushl %eax
+	leal 0x1000+BF_FRAME-4(ctx),%eax
+	movl 0x1000+BF_FRAME-4(ctx),tmp2
+	pushl %eax
+	xorl tmp3,tmp3
+BF_loop_P:
+	BF_ENCRYPT_START
+	addl $8,tmp5
+	BF_ENCRYPT_END
+	leal 0x1000+18*4+BF_FRAME(ctx),tmp1
+	movl tmp5,BF_ptr
+	cmpl tmp5,tmp1
+	movl L,-8(tmp5)
+	movl R,-4(tmp5)
+	movl P(0),tmp2
+	ja BF_loop_P
+	leal BF_FRAME(ctx),tmp5
+	xorl tmp3,tmp3
+	movl tmp5,BF_ptr
+BF_loop_S:
+	BF_ENCRYPT_START
+	BF_ENCRYPT_END
+	movl P(0),tmp2
+	movl L,(tmp5)
+	movl R,4(tmp5)
+	BF_ENCRYPT_START
+	BF_ENCRYPT_END
+	movl P(0),tmp2
+	movl L,8(tmp5)
+	movl R,12(tmp5)
+	BF_ENCRYPT_START
+	BF_ENCRYPT_END
+	movl P(0),tmp2
+	movl L,16(tmp5)
+	movl R,20(tmp5)
+	BF_ENCRYPT_START
+	addl $32,tmp5
+	BF_ENCRYPT_END
+	leal 0x1000+BF_FRAME(ctx),tmp1
+	movl tmp5,BF_ptr
+	cmpl tmp5,tmp1
+	movl P(0),tmp2
+	movl L,-8(tmp5)
+	movl R,-4(tmp5)
+	ja BF_loop_S
+	movl 4(%esp),%esp
+	popl %edi
+	popl %esi
+	popl %ebx
+	popl %ebp
+	ret
+
+BF_die:
+/* Oops, need to re-compile with a larger BF_FRAME. */
+	hlt
+	jmp BF_die
+
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__ELF__) && defined(__linux__)
+.section .note.GNU-stack,"",@progbits
+#endif